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I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2007, the world had a ringside seat to a truly
macabre fight. Under the glare of television cameras, Anna Nicole
Smith's nearest but not dearest' battled in a Florida probate court
over custody of her body. 2 The parties agreed on only one point: "Anna
Nicole Smith's appearance was a paramount issue to her."3 Yet, those
same parties denied Anna Nicole after death the beauty she prized
during life. Because of their protracted legal wrangling, Anna Nicole
went to her grave a decomposed corpse in a closed casket. 4
Anna Nicole Smith's tragic fate is by no means unique. For
nearly three months, the body of the self-styled "Godfather of Soul,"
James Brown, lay refrigerated in a secret location while his children,
disputed wife, 6 and executors fought over his final resting place.7
1.
Anna Nicole Smith's "nearest and dearest" was her son, Daniel, who died tragically on
September 10, 2006 at the age of twenty. See Michelle Caruso, Anna Nicole Smith Mourns Loss
of Son, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 11, 2006 (reporting Daniel's death). She reportedly "never
recovered from her son's death" and even tattooed a picture of Daniel on her left shoulder to
"keep Daniel with her forever." Alex Tresniowski et al., What Did Anna Want?, PEOPLE, Mar. 5,
2007, at 67. The participants in the battle over Anna Nicole's remains were her
lawyer/companion/agent/reality TV-show co-star, Howard K. Stern; her estranged mother, Virgie
Arthur; her former lover, Larry Birkhead; and her infant daughter's court-appointed guardian,
Richard Milstein. See generally James T.R. Jones, Anna Nicole Smith and the Right to Control
Disposition of the Dead, LOUISVILLE BAR BRIEFS, May 2007, at 24, available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=996496 (analyzing the legal issues surrounding the disposition of the
body in the Anna Nicole Smith case).
2.
See, e.g., Who Should Bury Anna Nicole?: Battle in Florida Courtroom (ABC television
broadcast Feb. 21, 2007) (live broadcast of the Anna Nicole Smith probate proceedings).
3.
In re Marshall, No. 07-00824 (61), slip op. at 5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Prob. Div. Feb. 22, 2007),
available at http://i.a.cnn.netcnn/2007/images/02/22/finalorderO7824.pdf
[hereinafter In re
Marshall].
4.
The medical examiner, Dr. Joshua Perper, said after the appeals court ruling that "he
was not sure if Smith's body would be suitable for a viewing. He had told [Judge] Seidlin during
the hearing that she was decomposing, even though she had already been embalmed." Last
Respects Paid to Anna Nicole Smith at Bahamas Funeral, Burial Services, Mar. 4, 2007,
http://www.foxnews.com. Despite mortuary workers' use of "special embalming cream that
smoothes decayed flesh," Jennifer Fermino, Patrick Gallahue & David K. Lee, Anna Will Be
Drop-Dead Gorgeous-Dolled Up in Tiara, Luxe Gown for Burial, N.Y. POST, Mar. 2, 2007, at 3,
she was ultimately buried in a closed casket. Last Respects, supra.
5.
See, e.g., Last Will and Testament of James Brown (Aug. 1, 2000) ("I, James Brown, also
known as 'The Godfather of Soul',... do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my Last
Will and Testament ...").
6.
Tomi Rae Hynie may not in fact be James Brown's legal widow because she was
married to another man, Javed Ahmed, at the time she married James Brown. See Mike Wynn &
Johnny Edwards, Brown Will Predates Marriage, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 16, 2007, at B1. Her
first marriage was not annulled until nearly three years after she married Brown. Id.
7.
See Virginia Anderson, Brown's Body to Be Placed in Crypt Today, COX NEWS SERVICE,
Mar. 9, 2007 (noting that Brown's body had "been kept in a refrigerated room.., at an
undisclosed location" after his children moved it from his estate while feuding with Brown's
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Evangelist Billy Graham and his wife, Ruth, had an even more
unfortunate experience. Unlike Anna Nicole Smith and James Brown,
the Grahams were still alive when their children engaged in "a
struggle worthy of the Old Testament"8 over where to bury the elderly
couple .
Red Sox legend Ted Williams suffered the ultimate indignity.
After a family feud over his body,10 the once "Splendid Splinter"
became a frozen, cracked head in an Arizona cryonics laboratory. 1
With a greasy scrap of paper 12 and a blind faith in the "miracles" of
personal representatives); Deal Reached On James Brown's Burial Place, AP, Feb. 20, 2007 (on
file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
8.
Laura Sessions Stepp, A Family at Cross-Purposes;Billy Graham's Sons Argue Over a
FinalResting Place, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2006, at Al.
Franklin Graham "wanted the couple to be buried at the site of the Billy Graham
9.
Library, which [was] to open next year in Charlotte, N.C." while Ned Graham "supported the
longtime wishes of his mother, Ruth Graham, 86, to be buried at The Cove... in Asheville, N.C."
Adelle M. Banks, Graham Says Burial Place Still Undecided, RELIGION NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 19,
2006. On December 18, 2006, Billy Graham announced that he and his wife were "still
considering the appropriate physical burial spot." Id. He issued a statement, which read in part:
"As for our final resting place, we are prayerfully pursuing that very personal decision regarding
That determination will not be made by our family, our organization or
the exact location ....
outsiders, but will be ours alone." Id. On June 13, 2007, the day before his wife's death, Billy
Graham revealed that during the spring the couple "made the decision to be buried beside each
other at the Billy Graham Library...." Adelle M. Banks, Ruth Graham in Coma as Family
Reveals Burial Plans, RELIGION NEWS SERVICE, June 13, 2007. On June 17, 2007, "Ruth Bell
Graham was buried at the foot of a cross-shaped walkway in the Prayer Garden" at the Billy
Graham Library. Scripture, Lilies Adorn Private Burial Service, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, VA),
June 18, 2007, at B4.
10. The battle over disposition of Ted Williams's remains began on July 5, 2002, four days
after Williams's death. Thomas C. Tobin et al., A Tug of War Over Ted, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
July 9, 2002, at 1A. Williams's daughter, Barbara Joyce Williams Ferrell, claimed that her father
wished to be cremated but her half-siblings, John Henry Williams and Claudia Williams, claimed
that Williams wanted to be cryogenically frozen. Id. The parties reached a private settlement
agreement on December 20, 2002 and Ferrell ended her efforts to have her father's body
cremated. Raja Mishra, Williams Children Settle Dispute; Slugger's Body to Remain Frozen in
Cryonics Tank, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 21, 2002, at BI. For an analysis of the decedent's right to
direct disposition of the body and the Ted Williams case, see generally Alexander A. Bove, Jr. &
Melissa Langa, Ted Williams: Is He Headed for the Dugout or the Deep Freeze? Property Rights in
a DeadBody Resurrected,MASS. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 19, 2002.
11. See Tom Verducci, What Really Happened to Ted Williams: A Year After the Jarring
News that the Splendid Splinter Was Being Frozen in a Cryonics Lab, New Details, Including a
Decapitation, Suggest that One of America's Greatest Heroes May Never Rest in Peace, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 18, 2003, at 66.
12. Ted Williams's Will directed that his "remains be cremated and [his] ashes sprinkled at
sea off the coast of Florida where the water is very deep." Last Will and Testament of Theodore
S. Williams (Dec. 20, 1996) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review). These instructions were
"overridden by a greasy scrap of paper produced by John Henry Williams 10 days after his
father's death. The crude, handwritten note, purportedly stored in the trunk of the car, describes
a vague commitment to 'bio-stasis,' and carries the signature of the Splendid Splinter and two of
his children." Tim Sullivan, Williams Deserves a Hero's Farewell, COPLEY NEWS SERVICE, Aug.
22, 2003. The note read: "JHW, Claudia, and Dad all agree to be put in Bio-Stasis after we die.
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modern medicine, 13 John Henry Williams consigned his father to the
ranks of the living dead. Today, a great American hero is literally and
figuratively suspended 14 between life and death and "may never rest
in peace." 15
Disputes among a decedent's survivors are all too familiar to
trusts and estates scholars and practitioners. Case reporters,
textbooks, journals, tabloids, and websites regularly feature
contentious and often bitter litigation over decedents' estates.1 6 These
disputes have exposed a major challenge facing inheritance law today:
adapting to the changing American "family." As a vast scholarly
literature has documented,1 7 inheritance law continues to privilege

This is what we want, To be able to be Together in The future, even if it is [only a] chance."
Williams Note (Nov. 2, 2000) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
13. See Jules Crittenden et al., No Show; Williams' Son Ducks All-Star Appearance,
BOSTON HERALD, July 10, 2002, at 1 (stating that "John Henry Williams deeply believes in the
potential of cryonics to someday offer his father a new chance at life"). Proponents claim that
"[c]ryonics ... [will] ultimately brin[g] back the deceased not as elderly patients at their clinical
point of death but rather in a 'rejuvenated' state." Kevin Paul Dupont, The Idea is Revival of the
Fittest, BOSTON GLOBE, May 30, 2007, at C6 (citing Ben Best, President of the Michigan-based
Cryonics Institute). If this prediction proves correct, "an awakened [Ted] Williams would not
reappear as he did in the days prior to his death, but instead as the vital twenty- or thirtysomething he was during the prime of his life as a Red Sox star." Id. Opponents, however,
contend that " '[t]here is no scientific evidence that patients will ever stand a chance of being
brought back . . .' liken[ing] the technology needed to reanimate a cryonics patient to the process
of trying to turn a hamburger back into a cow." Jane Fryer, The Human Deep Freeze, DAILY MAIL
(London), July 29, 2006, at 20 (quoting Dr. Arthur Rowe).
14. Cleavage-bearing Clinton Depicted in 'PresidentialBust,' CBC NEWS, Aug. 10, 2006,
(reporting
that
Ted
http://www.cbc.ca/arts/story/2006/08/10/clinton-sculpture-bust.html
Williams's body "was placed in cryonic suspension in hopes that medical science could possibly
revive him in the future").
15. Verducci, supra note 11, at 66. It should be noted that survivors' disputes may continue
even after burial of their loved ones. See, e.g., Cottingham v. McKee, 821 So. 2d 169 (Ala. 2001)
(involving a dispute between the decedent's next of kin and personal representative over
exhumation and cremation of the decedent's body); Kathryn Shattuck, Rothko Kin Sue to
Transfer His Remains, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2008, at El (discussing a petition by artist Mark
Rothko's children to disinter their father's body and rebury it in a Jewish cemetery thirty-eight
years after their father's death).
16. For instance, leading trusts and estates casebooks have reproduced In re Estate of
Kuralt, 15 P.3d 931 (Mont. 2000), a dispute between the wife and the longtime lover of CBS
newsman Charles Kuralt over property in Montana. See, e.g., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 4-39
(Lawrence W. Waggoner et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006); WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 245 (Jesse
Dukeminier et al. eds., 7th ed. 2005). A wide variety of sources discussed claims to Marlon
Brando's estate. See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in the
Law of Trusts, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 713, 714-15 (2006); Steve Gorman, Faces From Brando's Past
Clamor for Piece of Estate, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 26, 2004, at A2; Lawsuit Filed Over Brando
Estate, CBS NEWS, July 4, 2006, available at http://www.cbsnews.constories/2006/07/04/
entertainmentlmainl774399.shtml. For an example of tabloid coverage of a family feud over an
estate, see Bob Burns, Found! James Brown's Secret Daughter,GLOBE, July 2, 2007, at 16.
17. See infra Part II.A.
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membership in a "traditional" family that "fewer and fewer Americans
18
experience as reality."
In earlier work, I identified the human costs of an inheritance
system that prizes family status above need, merit, and support. 19 I
looked abroad to foreign models, especially China's distinctive
approach to inheritance, as inspiration for reform of American
inheritance law. 20 Based on my comparative study, I concluded that
reformers should look beyond what I called the "family paradigm of
inheritance law" 21 to consider more flexible schemes that would base
inheritance rights on survivors' actual relationships with decedents
22
rather than formal familial ties.
This Article finds inspiration closer to home in an area
surprisingly neglected in the trusts and estates literature: resolution
of survivors' conflicts over the disposition of a decedent's remains. 23
This Article is not the first to do so. In her 1999 article, The Property
of Death, Tanya Herndndez demonstrated that an outdated definition
of family pervades approaches to disposition of decedents' bodies as

18. Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 271
(2001).
19. Id. at 240-51.
20. Frances H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance:A New Model from China, 1999
WIS. L. REV. 1199 (1999); Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?:
The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 77 (1998).
21. Foster, supra note 18, at 199.
22. Id. at 240-43, 245-47, 250-51, 268-71; Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance,supra
note 20, at 1256-58; Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model, supra note 20, at 124-26.
23. As Remigius N. Nwabueze has noted:
[The] concept of burial rights or rights of sepulcher [has at its "core"] five
categories... (1) the next of kin's right to possession of a decedent's corpse
for the purpose of burial; (2) the right to receive the decedent's body in the
condition it was when life left it; (3) the right to determine the time, place
and manner of burial; and (4) the right to be notified of the decedent's death
before its burial or cremation; and (5) rights relating to the disturbance of the
grave (or right of repose).
Remigius N. Nwabueze, The Concept of Sepulchral Rights in Canada and the U.S. in the Age of
Genomics: Hints From Iceland, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 217, 219, 241 (2005). This
Article focuses only on the first category-the right to possession of a decedent's remains. The
related issue of disposition of a decedent's organs is also outside the scope of this Article. For a
sampling of the extensive literature on this topic, see generally Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My
Property, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28 (1986); Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of
Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 57 (1989); Sheldon Kurtz & Michael J.
Saks, The Transplant Paradox: Overwhelming Public Support for Organ Donation vs. UnderSupply of Organs: The Iowa Organ Procurement Study, 21 J. CORP. L. 767 (1996); Symposium,
Organ Donation, 20 J. CORP. L. 1 (1994). For a comprehensive discussion of legal rules affecting
the dead, see Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead (Ariz. Legal Studies Discussion Paper
No. 06-27, 2006), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=924499.
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well as assets. 24 She found a possible model for inheritance reform in
mortal remains legislation. 25 This Article also identifies a potential
model for reform but in a different place-judicial practice rather than
legislation. Close analysis of published opinions regarding disputes
over dead bodies reveals a striking pattern. In more than one hundred
of such opinions since the late nineteenth century, courts have
deviated from the formal status-based rules governing disposition of
remains. They have instead employed the very approach inheritance
reformers have rejected-an equitable, individualized scheme that
transcends the family paradigm. Regular use of this equitable,
individualized scheme would allow the courts to exercise "benevolent
discretion" 26 to recognize the particular decedent's intent and actual
relationships with her survivors. In light of its success in the mortal
remains context, this approach could be the solution for which
inheritance law reformers are searching.
Part II demonstrates that the family paradigm distorts
dispositions of decedents' assets and remains. Part III presents a
critical analysis of recent reform strategies to address that paradigm.
It argues that those strategies offer only limited responses because
they remain grounded in the family paradigm. Part IV looks to the
past for answers for the future. It shows that rather than basing their
decisions on survivors' family status alone, American courts have a
long tradition of individualized justice in resolving disputes over dead
bodies. Part V concludes that reformers-including legal scholars,
legislators, judges, practitioners, activists, and interest groupsshould draw on this historical precedent to develop more flexible,
individualized, and family-neutral schemes for dispositions of
decedents' assets and remains.

24. Tanya K. Herndndez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PIrr. L. REV. 971, 971-75, 983-89
(1999).
25. Id. at 975 (arguing that "mortal remains legislation is a mechanism for modernizing"
trusts and estates law).
26. See De Festetics v. De Festetics, 81 A. 741, 742 (N.J. Ch. 1911); Yome v. Gorman, 242
N.Y. 395, 402 (N.Y. 1926).
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II. THE CHALLENGE OF ADAPTING TO THE CHANGING AMERICAN
"FAMILY"

A. The Outdated Family Paradigmof InheritanceLaw
Inheritance law is entrenched in a family paradigm.2 7 Rules
governing disposition of a decedent's estate-be it disposition by
intestacy, will, contract to devise, or will substitute 2 8-give preference
to the so-called "natural objects of the decedent's bounty," 29 the
decedent's closest family members by blood, adoption, or marriage.
Trusts and estates scholars have challenged this rigid status-based
scheme as out of step with modern American society. They have
presented a compelling case that inheritance law "must adapt to
30
recognize the changing nature of the American family."
In an extensive and ever-growing literature, 3 1 trusts and
estates scholars have demonstrated that inheritance law's narrow
definition of "natural objects" is both outdated and underinclusive.
They have argued that the conventional definition of family as "a
32
legally married husband and wife and the children of that marriage"
fails to recognize the full range of today's families. Mary Louise
Fellows, 33 Thomas Gallanis, 34 and Gary Spitko, 35 for example, have
27. Foster, supra note 18.
28. See id. at 205-21 (discussing the preference for close family members in intestacy, wills,
contracts to devise, and will substitutes).
29. See Mundy v. Simmons, 424 A.2d 135, 139 (Me. 1980) (defining "the surviving spouse
and those who stand in closest relationship within the bloodline as the natural objects of the
decedent's bounty").
30. E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of NonMarital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1094 (1999). For an outstanding, comprehensive
analysis of the failure of inheritance law to "reflect modern family life," see generally RALPH C.
BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY (2004).
31. For a review of the literature, see Foster, supra note 18, at 228-33.
32. Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 28
(2000).
33. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance:An Empirical
Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1, 15-17, 65-72 (1998) (arguing that inheritance rules fail to recognize
committed relationships and family units headed by committed partners).
34. See, e.g., T.P. Gallanis, Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the Movement for SameSex Equality, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1513, 1522-24 (1999) (calling for reform of intestacy and other
default rules to "replicate the likely intent of members of the GLB [Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual]
community," including recognition of same-sex partners as heirs); T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance
Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L. REV. 55 (2004) (proposing inheritance law reforms to
recognize domestic partners).
35. See, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-factorApproach to Inheritance Rights for
UnmarriedCommitted Partners,81 OR. L. REV. 255, 256 (2002) (arguing that "[c]urrent intestacy
law generally does not reflect as well as it could the way Americans today structure their family
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shown that the narrow definition of "spouse" excludes domestic
36
partners and other survivors of nonmarital committed relationships.
Ralph Brashier has emphasized that another "increasingly notable
shortcoming[ of modern probate law is its failure to provide adequate
guidelines governing the inheritance rights of children outside the
traditional nuclear family. 37 In response, numerous authors propose
expanding the definition of "child" to encompass children customarily
38
barred from inheritance, such as children of unmarried cohabitants,
nonmarital children, 39 equitably adopted children, 40 children produced
by reproductive technology, 41 and nonrelated individuals in a childparent relationship with the decedent. 42 Other critics have called

lives"); Spitko, The Expressive Functionof Succession Law, supra note 30, at 1064-65 (discussing
inheritance law's discrimination against gay men and lesbians and their relationships).
36. See generally Melissa Aubin, Comment, Defying Classification: Intestacy Issues for
Transsexual Surviving Spouses, 82 OR. L. REV. 1155 (2003) (discussing inheritance issues
confronting transsexual spouses).
37. Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the NontraditionalFamily, 1996 UTAH
L. REV. 93, 94.
38. See, e.g., Fellows et al., supra note 33, at 65-72; Carissa R. Trast, Note, You Can't
Choose Your Parents: Why Children Raised by Same-Sex Couples Are Entitled to Inheritance
Rights from both Their Parents,35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 857 (2006).
39. See, e.g., Karen A. Hauser, Inheritance Rights for Extramarital Children: New Science
Plus Old Intermediate Scrutiny Add up to the Need for Change, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 891 (1997);
Linda Kelly Hill, Equal Protection Misapplied: The Politics of Gender and Legitimacy and the
Denial of Inheritance, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 129 (2006); Browne Lewis, Children of
Men: Balancing the Inheritance Rights of Marital and Non-Marital Children, 39 U. TOL. L. REV.
1 (2007); Patricia G. Roberts, Adopted and Nonmarital Children-Exploring the 1990 Uniform
ProbateCode's Intestacy and Class Gift Provisions, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 539 (1998).
40. See, e.g., Michael J. Higdon, When Informal Adoption Meets Intestate Succession: The
Cultural Myopia of the Equitable Adoption Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (2008);
Rebecca C. Bell, Comment, Virtual Adoption: The Difficulty of Creating an Exception to the
Statutory Scheme, 29 STETSON L. REV. 415 (1999); James R. Robinson, Comment, Untangling the
"Loose Threads": Equitable Adoption, Equitable Legitimation, and Inheritance in Extralegal
FamilyArrangements, 48 EMORY L.J. 943 (1999).
41. See, e.g., Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem
Conception, ParentalResponsibility, and Inheritance, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 967 (1996); Katheleen R.
Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part:Assisted Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth, 31
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193 (1997); Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance
Consequences of Reproductive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091 (1997).
42. See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, The Parent-ChildRelationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U.
MEM. L. REV. 643, 648 (2002) (arguing that "intestacy's definition of the parent-child
relationship . . . based solely on biology or adoption [is] inadequate for many families"). According
to Professor Gary:
Many parents cannot adopt the children they raise, either because a
biological parent will not relinquish parental rights or because the
jurisdiction does not permit adoption by unmarried persons, gay men, or
lesbians. Other parents may not adopt due to financial constraints or failure
to see a need to formalize a relationship that functions well on its own. For
any of these parents and children, the existing intestacy statutes may not
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attention to inheritance law's exclusion of a decedent's extended 43 and
blended 44 family members. A few scholars go still further. John
Gaubatz, 45 Laura Rosenbury, 46 and I,47 for example, have
demonstrated that by privileging the traditional family, inheritance
law ignores the claims of survivors the decedent may have valued
most: her close friends, caregivers, and other nonrelatives with whom
she shared an "affection-support" 48 relationship.
Trusts and estates scholars have identified another challenge
to inheritance law's family paradigm: the escalation of violence, abuse,
and neglect within today's American families. 49 For these scholars, the
conventional definition of family is overinclusive rather than
underinclusive. As Susan Gary has aptly remarked, "legal ties do not
necessarily create familial ties."50
Critics have called for a redefinition of family to exclude even
members of the "traditional" family for mistreatment of the

carry out the decedent's intent and certainly do not support the family
relationships created by the decedent.
Id. at 680.
43. See, e.g., Kristine S. Knaplund, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren and the
Implications for Inheritance, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2006) (calling attention to the difficulties
individuals can face in inheriting from the grandparents who raised them).
44. See, e.g., Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and
Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 918 (1989) (arguing that intestate succession law "ignores
stepfamilies"); Peter T. Wendel, The Non-Stepparent Adoption Scenario and Inheritance Rights:
Shades of the Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 351 (2005)
(arguing that inheritance laws that exclude children adopted by a "step-partner" unfairly
discriminate against children adopted outside of the marital context).
45. John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497, 559
(1977) (arguing that inheritance law should recognize that a "decedent's close family might
include nonblood relatives and friends").
46. Laura Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 204-05 (2007) ("Even
if friends are performing many, or all, of the functions traditionally ascribed to spouses, parents,
or children, friends are not eligible ... to inherit each other's estates under state intestacy
rules."); id. at 205 n.69 ("[T]he bias against friendship is so established that no competent lawyer
would draft a trust leaving property to a settlor's 'friends.'. . . However, competent lawyers still
regularly draft trusts that leave property to a settlor's 'family' or 'relatives.' ").
47. Foster, supra note 18, at 245 ('The family paradigm... declares 'unnatural' the very
relationships that many people ... often experience as 'natural'-caring relationships with
extended family members, nonmarital partners, close friends, and nonrelated caregivers."). See
also Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 20, at 1239-40 (arguing that statusbased rules exclude caregivers).
48. Cristy G. Lomenzo, Note, A Goal-Based Approach to Drafting Intestacy Provisions for
Heirs Other than Surviving Spouses, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 960 (1995).
49. See Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model, supra note 20, at 79-80 & nn.5-6
(discussing the "escalating violence and neglect within today's family"). For grim statistics on
family violence, see Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family Property: A Proposal for
Reform, 13 LAW & INEQ. 401, 403-06 (1995).
50. Gary, supranote 32, at 41.
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decedent. 5 1 They have shown that by focusing on survivors' family
status alone, current rules assume that the decedent's "closest"
relatives are entitled to inherit and ignore those individuals' actual
behavior toward the decedent, no matter how reprehensible. The
result is an inheritance system that effectively allows wrongdoers to
inherit from their victims. 52 Indeed, critics of the status-based model
of inheritance 53 have presented overwhelming evidence that close
relatives can abuse, abandon, and fail to support a decedent yet still
inherit from that decedent. Paula Monopoli, for instance, has
demonstrated that status-based rules permit "deadbeat dads" to
inherit from the children they neglected. 54 Similarly, Kymberleigh
Korpus has cited horrific cases in which children physically,
emotionally, and financially abused their elderly parents and still
retained inheritance rights as the "natural objects" of the parents they
55
mistreated.
Many authors have emphasized the challenge for inheritance
law of addressing misconduct within the family. 56 A few legal scholars
have focused as well on a more positive societal development:
supportive relationships both within and outside the traditional
nuclear family. 57 These critics of the status-based definition of family
have called for a comprehensive "behavior-based model of
inheritance"5 8 that would factor in "good" as well as "bad" behavior
51. Foster, supra note 18, at 230-31.
52. Foster, Towards a Behavior-BasedModel, supra note 20, at 80.
53. See, e.g., Paula A. Monopoli, "DeadbeatDads" Should Support and Inheritance Be
Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 297 (1994) (advocating following a "behavior-based model"
rather than a "status-based model").
54. Id. at 259-60. For other discussions of inheritance by parents who abandoned or failed
to support their children, see Anne-Marie E. Rhodes, Abandoning Parents Under Intestacy:
Where We Are, Where We Need to Go, 27 IND. L. REV. 517 (1994); Alison M. Stemler, Note,
Parents Who Abandon or Fail to Support Their Children and Apportionment of Wrongful Death
Damages, 27 J. FAM. L. 871 (1988-89).
55. Kymberleigh N. Korpus, Note, Extinguishing InheritanceRights: CaliforniaBreaks New
Ground in the Fight Against Elder Abuse But Fails to Build an Effective Foundation, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 537 (2001). For a discussion of family violence, see Preble, supra note 49.
56. See, e.g., Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model, supra note 20, at 80-81 (discussing
reforms to disqualify heirs for misconduct toward the decedent); Foster, supranote 18, at 230-32
(same); Anne-Marie Rhodes, Consequences of Heirs' Misconduct: Moving From Rules to
Discretion, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 975 (2007) (exploring various obstacles the law faces in
addressing heirs' misconduct).
57. For extended discussions of support and inheritance, see Foster, Linking Support and
Inheritance,supra note 20; Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom,
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=11i2522.
58. Monopoli, supra note 53, at 297 (proposing "a behavior-based model of inheritance by
fathers from their deceased children" that permits courts to "deviat[e] from a status-based
model"); Korpus, supra note 55, at 573 (advocating behavior-based statutes to "extinguish
inheritance rights" of heirs who abused elderly relatives). In earlier work, I called for an
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toward the decedent. 59 Such a focus would encourage and reward care
and support to those in need and allocate decedents' assets more
equitably.
As the next Section will show, the family paradigm-with all
its flaws-applies to the disposition of a decedent's remains as well as
her assets.
B. Extension to Disposition of Remains
In The Property of Death,60 Tanya Herntndez demonstrated
that the family paradigm extends beyond the inheritance context. She
showed that the paradigm also defines and constrains survivors'
rights to a loved one's remains. 6 1 Professor Hern~ndez exposed an
outdated, systemic "bias" 62 in the formal rules in favor of traditional,
or as she terms them, "biological," 63 family members. She showed that
those rules require courts, legislatures, and funeral homes to treat a
decedent's closest relatives by blood, adoption, or marriage as the
"natural" recipients of a decedent's body as well as bounty. 64 In theory,
extension of the behavior-based model "to use inheritance for 'encouraging and rewarding'
exemplary conduct within the family and society" as well as for punishing "bad" behavior. Foster,
Towards a Behavior-Based Model, supra note 20, at 81.
59. See, e.g., Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model, supra note 20, at 81 (emphasizing
"good" as well as "bad" behavior); Gaubatz, supra note 45, at 511-12, 562-63 (emphasizing the
need to "provid[e] for the meritorious"); Rhodes, supra note 54 (discussing approaches for
rewarding a decedent's "caring parent" as well as penalizing a decedent's "abandoning parent");
Trent J. Thornley, Note, The Caring Influence: Beyond Autonomy as the Foundation of Undue
Influence, 71 IND. L.J. 513, 540-49 (1996) (proposing a "care sensitive" standard to benefit a
claimant who was in a "caring relationship" with the decedent).
60. HernAndez, supra note 24.
61. Id. at 971-75, 983-89.
62. Id. at 975.
63. Id. at 974 n.17 ("I purposely refrain from using the alternative term 'traditional family'
in order to avoid engaging in the fiction that families of choice are a recent novelty."). Professor
Herndndez defines "biological family... [to] encompass those persons who are not genetically
related to a decedent yet are viewed as family by probate codes, such as spouses and adopted
children." Id.
64. See id. at 972-75, 982-84, 988-89, 992-94 (citing cases and statutes that exhibit a
"familial approach" to disposition of remains). "Under both common law and statutes, spouses
have first priority in determining what will happen with the body of a deceased spouse in the
absence of other directions by the decedent. If there is no spouse, or if the couple has separated
by divorce decree, then both statutes and common law grant priority of decision-making in the
descending order of the consanguinity of the deceased." Jennifer E. Horan, Note, "When Sleep at
Last Has Come" Controlling the Disposition of Dead Bodies for Same-Sex Couples, 2 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 423, 424 (1999). See also Tracie M. Kester, Note, Can the Dead Hand Control the
Dead Body? The Case for a Uniform Bodily Remains Law, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 571, 573-77
(2007) (summarizing case law and statutes giving the decedent's spouse and next of kin the right
to possess and bury the decedent's body). For extended discussion of the issues funeral homes
confront in disputes between traditional and nontraditional family members, see generally Mark
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a decedent's instructions regarding disposition of her body are
supposed to trump family survivors' preferences. 65 Yet, Professor
Herndndez documented that the familial bias is so strong that in
practice, funeral homes and probate courts may disregard even a
decedent's express written "directions for the disposal of mortal
remains to gratify the contrary burial wishes of next of kin."66 Recent
cases confirm that the family paradigm remains influential today.
Consider, for example, the Anna Nicole Smith case. Judge
Larry Seidlin used the conventional definition of "natural objects"the decedent's intestate heirs 67-to determine who was the closest
family member entitled to Anna Nicole's remains. 68 Under Florida
intestacy law, Anna Nicole's infant daughter, Dannielynn, was her
"only child, heir, and next of kin. '69 Accordingly, Judge Seidlin ruled
that neither Anna Nicole's unmarried cohabitant, Howard Stern, nor
her mother, Virgie Arthur, had any legal rights to her remains.70 He
awarded custody of the body to a court-appointed guardian ad litem
71
for Dannielynn.

E. Wojcik, AIDS and Funeral Homes: Common Legal Issues Facing Funeral Directors, 27 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 411 (1994).
65. See Herndndez, supra note 24, at 982 (citing cases and statutes that "respect a
decedent's right to assert burial preferences and to otherwise dispose of his or her own body by
will as part of the freedom of testation").
66. Id. at 983 (describing the practice of some probate courts to minimize the testamentary
freedom of the decedent). See id. at 973 (stating that "funeral homes generally maintain a
familial approach to death which focuses upon the needs of the biological family and spouse
rather than upon the articulated preferences of a testator"). See also Nancy J. Knauer, The
September 11 Attacks and Surviving Same-Sex Partners:Defining Family Through Tragedy, 75
TEMP. L. REV. 31, 48 (2002) ("[E]ven assuming that a personal representative has the required
authority, there remains the possibility that a third party, such as a funeral director or a
cemetery, will refuse to honor the directions of the surviving partner, particularly where they are
contrary to the wishes of the next of kin.").
67. See In re Estate of Strozzi, 903 P.2d 852, 857 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that the
natural objects of a decedent's bounty "are ordinarily those persons designated to inherit from
him in the absence of a will").
68. In re Marshall, supra note 3, at pt. III. Judge Seidlin was "guided by Fla. Stat.
§ 406.50(4), which states, in relevant part: 'In the event more than one legally authorized person
claims a body for interment, the requests shall be prioritized in accordance with § 732.103,' " of
Florida's intestacy statute. Id. at pt. III.B.2.
69. Id. at pt. V. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.103(1) (West 2006) (providing that "the entire
intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse, descends ... [t]o the lineal descendants of the
decedent").
70. In re Marshall, supra note 3, at pt. III.B.3.
71. Id. at pt. IV. The appellate court affirmed this decision but used a different rationalethe guardian ad litem's commitment to fulfilling Anna Nicole Smith's intent to be buried in the
Bahamas next to her son, Daniel. Arthur v. Milstein, 949 So. 2d 1163, 1166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
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The battle over Minnesota Twins Hall of Famer 2 Kirby
Puckett's ashes provides another illustration of the family paradigm
in action. On March 6, 2006, the forty-five-year-old baseball icon died
in Arizona from a massive stroke. 73 Six days later, his body was
74
cremated in Minnesota and his ashes kept in a local funeral home.
Puckett was survived by his fianc6e, Jodi Olson; two children from a
prior marriage; and six siblings. 75 Puckett and Olson had lived
together since November 2004, had become engaged in October 2005,
and had a wedding planned for June 24, 2006.76 Olson "assumed the
ashes would be left with [her] as Kirby was going to be [her] husband
in just 90 days." 77 Unfortunately for Olson, the family paradigm
defeated her claim. Because Olson was not Puckett's "legally
recognized spouse," she was not entitled to his remains under either
Arizona or Minnesota law. 78 Instead, an Arizona judge awarded the
ashes to the legal guardian for Puckett's minor children. 79 That
guardian turned out to be the very person Kirby Puckett would
probably have least wanted to receive his remains: his ex-wife,
s0
Tonya.

72. Kirby Puckett played for the Minnesota Twins from 1984 until his retirement in 1996
and was elected to the Hall of Fame on the first ballot in 2001. Gordon Wittenmyer, Hall of
Famer and Twins Great Puckett Dies at Age 45, PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul, Minn.), Mar. 6, 2006.
73. Dan Shaughnessy, Puckett's Spirit Still with Twins, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8, 2006, at
E6.
74. Richard Meryhew, No Agreement on Who Will Get Puckett's Ashes; The Remains Could
Be Given Solely to Puckett's Two Children or Be Shared with his Fiancee, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), May 4, 2006, at lA.
75. Id.
76. Richard Meryhew, Puckett's Fiancee: He Wanted Ashes Spread on Ball Field, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), May 9, 2006, at lB.
77. Id. (quoting Jodi Olson). Olson planned to give some of Puckett's ashes to his children,
to spread some of the ashes over an inner-city baseball diamond as Puckett reportedly had "often
told her that he wanted," and to keep " 'a small bit' in a locket 'so [she] could feel Kirby close to
[her] heart,' " but had also discussed giving some of Puckett's ashes to his children. Id. (quoting
Jodi Olson).
78. In re Estate of Puckett, No. PB2006-000799, Release of Decedent's Remains,
Conclusions of Law, nos. 4, 7 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 2006), available at http://www.
courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docsfProbate/102006/m2423197.pdf.
79. Id. at Release of Decedent's Remains, Order.
80. Id. at Release of Decedent's Remains, Findings of Fact, nos. 3, 6 (stating that "Brian
Woods[,] ... the duly appointed and acting Personal Representative of Decedent's Estate
[and] ...

the Decedent's good friend and long-time business advisor. .. , relying upon his feelings

and those opinions of a sampling of Decedent's friends, firmly believes that the Decedent would
strongly oppose giving the Petitioner [Tonya Puckett] control over his remains in any capacity");
see Richard Meryhew, Kirby Puckett's Fall From Grace, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Oct. 31,
2006 (discussing Puckett's "bitter divorce [that] had made dealings with Tonya difficult" and
limited his access to his children).
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As the next Part will show, reformers have attempted to
address the inequities of the family paradigm. These reforms,
however, offer only limited responses in both the mortal remains and
inheritance contexts.

III. THE LIMITS OF RECENT REFORM STRATEGIES
Legal scholars have proposed two main strategies to respond to
the changing American family. They have proposed both modernizing
the traditional definition of family and developing schemes to bypass
the family paradigm altogether. These strategies fail because the
proposals still assume and perpetuate the family paradigm.
A. Redefining "Family"
Trusts and estates scholars have proposed three main
approaches to update traditional definitions of family to reflect today's
diverse family composition and circumstances: 8 1 (1) the "formal"
approach, (2) the "functional" approach, and (3) the "decedentcontrolled" approach. The formal approach attempts to "bring 'new'
families into the fold"8 2 by expanding intestacy's narrow statutory
definition of a decedent's "natural objects." The functional approach
focuses instead on the relationship between a decedent and her
survivors.8 3 This approach bases inheritance rights on whether
potential claimants "act[ed] like family members."8 4 The decedentcontrolled approach,8 5 in contrast, emphasizes a decedent's own
definition of her "family of choice."8 6 This approach allows a decedent's
"articulated preferences 8 7 to trump traditional status-based rules of
inheritance.

81. See Foster, supra note 18, at 228-35 (presenting an analysis of trusts and estates
scholars' approaches to updating the definition of family in inheritance law). For an extended
discussion of the formal and functional approaches, see Gary, supranote 32, at 31-67.
82. Gary, supra note 32, at 31.
83. Foster, supra note 18, at 232.
84. See Gary, supra note 32, at 42 (describing the functional approach as "determin[ing]
whether identified persons are acting like family members").
85. See Herndndez, supra note 24, at 1017 (referring to "decedent-controlled definitions of
family").
86. Id. at 981; see also Laura M. Padilla, Flesh of My Flesh but Not My Heir: Unintended
Disinheritance,36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 219, 221 n.8 (1997-98) (referring to "families by choice or
need," adopting the phrase from Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Family of Choice and Need, 35 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAm.L. 691, 691 (1996-97)).
87. Hernindez, supranote 24, at 973.
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Reformers in the mortal remains context have proposed
variations of all three approaches. And, just as in the inheritance
context, these three approaches are flawed because they retain
88
"family" as their reference point.
1. An Expanded Formal Definition of Family
The formal approach targets the common law and statutory
default rules that apply in cases where a decedent leaves no directions
regarding disposition of her body. As in inheritance law, these default
rules assign rights based on the survivor's formal familial status. The
decedent's spouse has the "paramount right"8 9 to control disposition of
the decedent's remains. If no spouse exists, then both common law and
statutes "grant priority of decision-making in descending order of
consanguinity of the deceased." 90
Reformers have attacked this status-based scheme for
excluding members of many of today's American families. They have
focused particular attention on the plight of same-sex partners, but
their arguments apply as well to unmarried opposite-sex partners.9 1
Commentators have shown that a narrow definition of "spouse"
effectively denies such partners the right to bury or cremate their
loved ones. 92 At worst, they argue, the default rules allow legally
recognized family members, who may well have disapproved of the

88. Foster, supra note 18, at 233.
89. See In re Dillon, 674 A.2d 735, 738 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (stating that "the paramount
right to possession and custody of a body and the concomitant right to control burial or other
disposition rests with the surviving spouse of the deceased").
90. Horan, supra note 64, at 424. Unlike intestacy statutes, however, mortal remains
statutes usually require that the decedent's next of kin be adults. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7100(a)(3), (5), (6) (West 2005) (limiting the "right to control the disposition of the
remains of a deceased person, the location and conditions of interment, and arrangements for
funeral goods and services" to "competent adult" children, siblings, and "persons ...in the next
degrees of kinship"). For a survey of "priority of decision laws," see Ann M. Murphy, Please Don't
Bury Me Down in that Cold Cold Ground: The Need for Uniform Laws on the Disposition of
Human Remains, 15 ELDER L.J. 381, 403-05 (2007).
91. See, e.g., Horan, supra note 64, at 424-25 (arguing that "people in [lesbian or gay]
relationships are passed over in the hierarchy of dispositional decision making"). Horan
recognizes that "opposite sex domestic partners will have some of the same problems with the
preference for spouses" but focuses her analysis on "same-sex couples because they are precluded
by law from legally marrying and thus suffer a unique problem in this area that is legally
difficult to rectify." Id. at 425 n.8.
92. See, e.g., Maureen B. Cohon, Where the Rainbow Ends: Trying to Find a Pot of Gold for
Same-Sex Couples in Pennsylvania, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 495, 511 (2003) ("But without written
instructions, the disposition of the body as well as funeral arrangements may proceed without
any input from the decedent's partner.").
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decedent's lifestyle, to exclude a surviving partner "from the planning
93
of funeral arrangements or even from the service itself."
These concerns are well founded. Consider, for example, the
experience of Tom, a forty-two-year-old businessman who lost his
partner, Rob, to AIDS.9 4 According to Tom, he and Rob "were together
emotionally, romantically, and physically" for nearly a decade and
lived together for four years. 95 Rob named Tom the executor of his
estate. 96 Yet after Rob's death, Rob's parents, not Tom, were given
custody of Rob's body. 97 As Tom discovered, "They had the legal rights
to his body and I did not."9 8 Rob's parents chose the date of the funeral
service and took over all funeral arrangements.9 9 At the service, Tom
felt invisible, as if he had never shared a life with Rob: "This was his
family's service, where I was treated as if I wasn't there. His family
had his business partner stand in the receiving line at the funeral ....
At the service, my family and I sat at the back."' 10 0
To ensure that partners receive the dignity and respect they
deserve, reformers have called upon lawmakers to expand the list of
family survivors entitled to control disposition of a decedent's
remains.1 0 1 Specifically, they have advocated granting surviving

93. MICHAEL SHERNOFF, GAY WIDOWERS: LIFE AFTER THE DEATH OF A PARTNER 145 (1977);
see also Terry L. Turnipseed, 2005-2006 Survey of New York Law: Estates and Trusts, 57
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1135, 1137 (2007) (arguing that the new New York law on disposition of
remains "prevents what many would consider the horrific sight of a decedent's body being hastily
taken away by blood family members and buried or cremated against the wishes of a surviving
unmarried (opposite- or same-sex) partner, who previously could be excluded completely from
arrangement planning"). In some cases, the surviving partner or the decedent may want to
exclude the decedent's biological family members. See Wojcik, supra note 64, at 422-23 (stating
that "[tihe life partner in a non-traditional family... may want a service that ... perhaps even
exclude[s] family who neglected the deceased because of objections to a 'chosen lifestyle' "); Mark
E. Wojcik, DiscriminationAfter Death, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 389, 400 (2000) ("In cases where a gay
son or lesbian daughter has been estranged from their biological families because of their sexual
orientation, that son or daughter may generally want decisions about a funeral service to be
made by a life partner or intimate friends rather than the estranged family.").
94. CAROLYN AMBLER WALTER, THE Loss OF A LIFE PARTNER: NARRATIVES OF THE
BEREAVED 143 (2003) (reporting the case of 'Tom" and "Rob").
95. Id. at 143-44 (quoting Tom).
96. Id. at 146.
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Tom).
99. Id. at 146, 206.
100. Id. at 147 (quoting Tom).
101. See, e.g., Gay Men's Health Crisis, The Case for Disposition of Remains Legislation,
http://www.gmhc.org/policy/nys/drl-case.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2008) (stating that "[t]he right
to control how one's body is handled after death injects dignity and simplicity into an area too
often fraught with fear and discomfort" and supporting New York legislation that would allow
"domestic partners ...[to] assume their rightful place as being equivalent to spouses for the
purposes of disposition of their loved one's remains... [and] recogniz[e] the growing variety of
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"domestic partners" the same status as surviving spouses. 10 2 Several
legislatures have moved towards this definition. For example, in 2006,
New Jersey amended its statutory default rules to grant "the
surviving domestic partner" as well as "[t]he surviving spouse of a
decedent" first priority "to control the funeral and disposition of
human remains."'1 3 A few states have gone beyond the same-sex
context to recognize other committed relationships. Just last year,
Washington amended its statutory default rules to give "domestic
partners" and spouses the same status. 10 4 Washington, however,
adopted a broader definition of "domestic partner" to encompass not
only survivors of same-sex relationships but also survivors of oppositesex relationships where one partner was at least sixty-two years of
age. 10 5 Maine's definition of "domestic partner" is even more inclusive:
"[O]ne of 2 unmarried adults who are domiciled together under longterm arrangements that evidence a commitment to remain responsible
10 6
indefinitely for each other's welfare."'
Statutes that explicitly recognize both adopted and biological
children or siblings provide another illustration of the formal
approach in action. For example, California law specifies that "a
natural or adopted child of the decedent"' 0 7 has the right to control
disposition of the decedent's remains. Until May 2007, a Minnesota
statute extended such a right to "biological or adopted" children and

family units which constitute the diverse cultural tapestry of this State"). Today, New York does
in fact assign domestic partners the same status as spouses. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201(2)(a)
(ii-a)
(Consol. 2008).
102. See, e.g., Horan, supra note 64, at 458 ("Ideally, legislators would amend their statutes
regarding disposition of the body to include the domestic partner equal to spouse within the
hierarchy of decision-makers."); W. BRAD JARMAN, RESTING IN PEACE: AN ANALYSIS OF
DISPOSITION OF REMAINS LAWS 21-22, 24-25 (Gay Men's Health Crisis 2004), available at
http://www.gmhc.org/policy/nys/disposremains-0804.pdf (stating that the priority list is
particularly "problematic" for domestic partners, "especially considering the prominent
placement of spouses in the priority list" and stating that New York should enact "a back-up
priority list which makes domestic partners legally equivalent to spouses").
103. 2005 N.J. Laws 331, § 29 (amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:27-22(a)(1) (West 2005)).
104. 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 156, § 24 (amending WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.160(3)(a) (2007)).
105. Id. § 4(6)(b). In addition, the domestic partners must "share a common residence," be
adults, be married or a domestic partner of no one other than the partner, be "capable of
consenting to the domestic partnership," be "not nearer of kin to each other than second
cousin... [,and not] a sibling, child, grandchild, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew to the other
person." Id. § 4(1)-(5).
106. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2843-A(1)(D)(1-A) (West Supp. 2005). The most recent
commentator on mortal remains legislation, Tracie Kester, has proposed a uniform bodily
remains law that includes, inter alia,the Maine definition of "domestic partner." Kester, supra
note 64, at 605.
107. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100(g) (West Supp. 2005).
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siblings. 0 8 For reasons that are not explained in the legislative
history, that language was removed.
The formal approach to modernizing the definition of family is
flawed in two respects. First, nearly all proposals and statutory
reforms extend rights only to survivors of legally registered committed
relationships or to legally adopted relatives. 10 9 Just as in the
inheritance context, reformers have thus accepted the conventional
statutory definition of family as "based on blood or formal legal
registration processes." 0 They have attempted to squeeze new forms
of relationships into existing family categories. 1 1 ' As a result, they
continue to exclude those who cannot" 2 or choose not 13 to enter into
such relationships.
Second, reformers address only a few aspects of the narrow
definition of family. They focus on the outdated definition of "spouse"
and, more rarely, "child" and "sibling." Interestingly, unlike their
trusts and estates counterparts, proponents of the formal approach in
the mortal remains context have largely ignored the claims of other
nontraditional family members, such as blended family members,
extended family members, and nonrelatives. 1 4 Yet, as one foreign
108. 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 114, § 40 (amending MINN. STAT. § 149A.80, subdiv. 2(3), (5)
(2006)).
109. The Maine statute may be an exception. Although the statute includes registration
requirements for "registered domestic partners," ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (Supp.
2005), it does not use the term "registered domestic partner" in the provisions on "custody of
remains of deceased persons." Id. § 2843-A(1)(D)(1-A) (emphasis added). Instead, it uses the term
"domestic partner." Id. In addition, the New York statute defines "domestic partner" to include
survivors of both registered and nonregistered relationships. A domestic partner is a person who
is formally recognized under federal, state, local, or foreign law as a party to a domestic
partnership or similar relationship or registered as the decedent's domestic partner with any
registry maintained by either party's employer or any state, municipality, or foreign jurisdiction;
or is formally designated as beneficiary or covered person under the decedent's employment
benefits or health insurance; or was "dependent or mutually interdependent on the...
[decedent] for support, as evidenced by the totality of the circumstances indicating a mutual
intent to be domestic partners .. " N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201(1)(c) (Consol. 2008).
110. Gary, supra note 32, at 31-32.
111. Id. at 60 (stating that the formal approach "does not attempt to incorporate new family
structures, but rather seeks to squeeze the new family structures into existing rules").
112. For example, statutes that apply only to same-sex partners would exclude survivors of
opposite-sex relationships of support and affection that are not spousal-type relationships.
113. See Foster, supra note 18, at 233-34 n.180, 247 n.241 (discussing and citing work by
feminist and lesbian and gay scholars that expressly rejects assimilation into conventional
marital categories on ideological or personal grounds); see also Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-factor
Approach, supra note 35, at 260 n.17 ('The partners might choose not to register their
relationship for fear of discrimination they might suffer as a consequence of registration.").
114. A possible exception may be Ohio legislation. In 2006, Ohio enacted a law that explicitly
extends "the right of disposition" to half-siblings as well as whole-siblings. H.R. 426, 126th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006) (enacting, inter alia, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.81(B)(4)
(West 2008)). One commentator has discussed a related issue-burial conflicts between divorced
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commentator has observed, "changing social trends resulting in
fragmentation of the traditional family unit and increasingly diverse
close personal relationships ... suggest there is every likelihood that
the number of burial conflicts will increase." 115
Exceptions exist, however. Close analysis of recent legislation
reveals that a few mortal remains statutes do what intestacy does not.
They give explicit recognition to those most excluded by the family
paradigm: survivors who were closest to the decedent by affection
rather than family status. 116 For example, North Carolina's statutory
default rules provide that "[a] person who has exhibited special care
and concern for the decedent," "may authorize the type, method, place,
and disposition of the decedent's body."11 7 District of Columbia
legislation extends similar rights to "[a]n adult friend or volunteer." 118
Yet these promising provisions do not truly challenge the
family paradigm. Although they acknowledge the existence of
nonrelated loved ones, they allow such individuals to control
disposition of a decedent's remains only if no "natural" family
members survive the decedent. 19 This approach effectively defines a
decedent's survivors as family and "others." It sends the message that
"love and feelings in some relationships just do not matter because
120
the ... status of these relationships is not traditional or legal."'
2. A Functional Definition of Family
The functional approach considers the specific relationship
between a decedent and her survivors. It "ask[s] whether the
relationship has the characteristics of a family and fulfills the goals
and needs of that relationship."' 21 Proponents of the functional
approach apply this model to effectuate two goals: (1) extending rights
to nontraditional family members who are not included in the "formal"
parents of the decedent-and has proposed a model interment statute to specify the rights of such
parents. Theresa E. Ellis, Note, Loved and Lost: Breathing Life into the Rights of Noncustodial
Parents,40 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 293-98, 308-09 (2005).
115. Heather Conway, Dead but Not Buried: Bodies, Burial and Family Conflicts, 23 LEGAL
STUD. 423, 452 (2003).
116. Foster, supra note 18, at 234, 245-48.
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-420(b)(6) (2007).
118. D.C. CODE § 3-413(a)(5) (2001).
119. For example, the North Carolina statute lists its provision at the bottom of the
hierarchy after "persons in the classes of the next degrees of kinship, in descending order, who,
under State law, would inherit the decedent's estate if the decedent died intestate." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 130A-420(b)(5), (6). For a similar critique of the New Mexico statute, see Horan, supra
note 64, at 444.
120. Arriola, supra note 86, at 694.
121. Horan, supra note 64, at 447.
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definition of family and (2) adjusting rights of legally recognized
family members to reflect lifetime behavior toward the decedent.
Under the functional approach, like the formal approach
described in the previous Section, reformers seek to expand the
traditional definition of family to include additional members of
today's American family. The focus is different, however. Rather than
challenging the statutory list of "natural" family members, proponents
of the functional approach emphasize the meaning of family. 122 They
call for a case-by-case analysis of whether the particular relationship
between survivor and decedent functioned in a manner analogous to
that of family members. 123 As Professor Hernindez has observed, "The
functional approach legitimizes non-nuclear relationships that share
the essential qualities of traditional relationships for a given context
by inquiring whether a relationship shares the main characteristics of
caring, commitment, economic cooperation and participation in
124
domestic responsibilities."'
A 1993 New York case illustrates how a functional approach
might work in assigning rights to a decedent's body. Stewart v.
Schwartz Brothers-Jeffer Memorial Chapel, Inc. involved a dispute
over disposition of Drew Stanton's remains between his partner of five
years, Michael Stewart, and Stanton's mother and brother, Joyce and
Scott Sobel. 125 The Sobels claimed that Stewart lacked standing
because he was neither Stanton's surviving spouse nor next of kin as
required by New York law at that time. 126 The court acknowledged
that Stewart did "not fit neatly into the legal definition of a spouse or
kin" 27 but nonetheless concluded that Stewart had standing because
of "the close, spousal-like relationship that existed between [Stewart]
and his 'significant other.' ",128 The court cited a number of facts to
support its decision. "Stanton and Stewart, both physicians, had been
122. See Gary, supra note 32, at 42 ("Initially, a functional approach raises the question of
what a family is rather than who is in the family.").
123. See Horan, supra note 64, at 447 ("The fact-intensive, functional approach requires the
court to look closely at the relationship and ask whether the relationship has the characteristics
of a family and fulfills the goals and needs of that relationship."); Note, Looking for a Family
Resemblance: The Limits of the FunctionalApproach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 1640, 1646 (1991) ("Instead of focusing on the identities and formal attributes of the
individuals within a relationship, the functional approach inquires whether a relationship shares
the essential characteristics of a traditionally accepted [family] relationship and fulfills the same
human needs.").
124. Herndndez, supra note 24, at 1006.
125. Stewart v. Schwartz Bros.-Jeffer Mem'l Chapel, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d 965, 966 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1993).
126. Id. at 967-68.
127. Id. at 968.
128. Id.

2008]

INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE

1371

lovers and companions for the previous five years." 129 "[T]he two
occupied" 130 a house that Stanton constructed. Stewart was the
of Stanton's estate. 31 Finally, Stewart
executor and sole beneficiary
"was building a future"1 32 with Stanton. Thus, to deny Stewart
standing would "illustrate a callous disregard of Stanton's and
Stewart's relationship."' 3 3 It should be noted, however, that although
the court used a functional approach, it stopped short of defining
Stewart as Stanton's "family" member. 34 Instead, it found that the
relationship between the two made Stewart the best "representative of
135
Stanton's wishes for the disposition of his remains."
The Stewart case reveals a second possible application of the
functional approach: evaluating whether survivors who are legally
entitled to a deceased relative's remains in fact behaved like family
members 136 toward the decedent. The court recognized that Stanton's
biological family members had the "general right to possession of the
decedent's remains."' 3 7 At the same time, however, the court
emphasized that the actual relationship between family members and
a decedent could trump this legal right: "The general rule giving the
right to determine the method of disposal of a decedent's remains to
the family is far from being absolute, especially in the present case
138
where the relations between Stanton and his family were strained."'
As in the inheritance context, 39 proponents of a functional
approach focus principally on "unworthy" survivors. They have sought
to exclude "undeserving next of kin"' 40 for not behaving toward the
decedent as a family member should. In her 2007 proposed Uniform
Disposition of Bodily Remains Act, Tracie Kester disqualifies "[a]
person who has been arrested for unlawfully and intentionally
committing an act against the decedent that resulted in or contributed

129. Id. at 966.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 968.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 967 ("[E]ven if the plaintiff had claimed to be the surviving spouse or next of kin
this court would have been hesitant to extend that status to him.").
135. Id.
136. See Gary, supra note 32, at 42 (discussing how a determination should be made as to
whether one has acted like a family member).
137. Stewart, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
138. Id. at 967. "[The plaintiff related that Stanton was alienated from his mother and
brother and that Stanton was particularly upset with his mother because she had ignored his
father's wish to be cremated and had him buried instead." Id. at 966.
139. See supra notes 27-59 and accompanying text.
140. Kester, supra note 64, at 588.
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to the death of the decedent ... [, t]he spouse of the decedent if the
spouse and decedent are legally separated or divorced at the time of
the death of the decedent 14 1 . . . [, and t]he decedent's parent if that
142
parent's parental rights have been terminated by court order."
Several state legislatures have gone still further recently,
adopting expansive behavior-based schemes that extend to misconduct
seldom addressed in inheritance law. For example, Ohio's 2006
legislation 143 explicitly excludes those charged with domestic violence
that resulted in or contributed to the decedent's death. 144 Similarly, in
March 2007,145 Utah enacted a statute that requires a person who was
"estranged" from the decedent at the time of the decedent's death to
forfeit her "right of disposition."1 46 The statute defines "estranged"
broadly as "a physical and emotional separation from the decedent at
the time of death which has existed for a period of time that clearly
demonstrates an absence of affection, trust, and regard for the
147
decedent."
A few legislatures even include provisions in mortal remains
1 48
statutes that are noticeably absent from intestacy statutes:
provisions that factor in family members' "good" as well as "bad"
behavior toward the decedent. Minnesota legislation is illustrative.
Section 149A.80 states that "[w]hen a dispute exists regarding the
right to control or duty of disposition ... [among] more than one
person with the same degree of relationship to the decedent. . . , the
court shall consider ... the degree of personal relationship between
the decedent and each of the persons in the same degree of
1 49
relationship to the decedent."
Although the functional approach offers a more nuanced and
updated definition of family, it too is ultimately "undermined by its
family perspective."1 5 0 As Professor Gary has observed, "If the

141. Under section 5 of the proposed law, a spouse is also excluded if she "abandoned the
deceased person prior to the deceased person's death." Id. at 605.
142. Id. at 607.
143. H.R. 426, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006).
144. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.77(B)(1) (West 2008). However, "[i]f the charges
... are dismissed or if the person is acquitted of such charges, the right is restored to the
person." Id. § 2108.77(B)(2).
145. 2007 Utah Laws 144, § 14 (enacting UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-9-603 (2008)).
146. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-9-603(2)(C).

147. Id. § 58-9-603(1).
148. See Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model, supra note 20, at 102, 125-26 (discussing
Chinese legislation that rewards "good" behavior); Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance,
supra note 20, at 1239, 1257 (same).
149. MINN. STAT. § 149A.80, subdiv. 5(2) (2006).
150. Foster, supra note 18, at 234.
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functional definition of family is based on the way a nuclear family
functions, then many non-traditional families may still be left out of
the definition." 151 Even the most recent proponent of the functional
approach has acknowledged its "risks" for the nontraditional families
it is supposed to encompass: "As courts search for what it means to be
a family, there is a risk of a 'force[d] conformance to heterosexual
models.' Furthermore, the risk exists that the courts will zero in on a
few factors as dispositive and ignore the larger question, 'Do they
function as a family?' "152
Because of these risks, reformers have explored another
approach to redefining the family, one that does not require
application of conventional notions of "family" behavior and functions.
3. A Decedent-Controlled Definition of Family
approach rejects all external
The decedent-controlled
definitions of family-be they legislative, judicial, or societal-and
permits the decedent to specify her own definition of family. 153 As
Professor Mary Clark has explained, "the deceased's next of kin...
[are] defined broadly to include whomever the deceased him or herself
designates[,] whether family (by blood, marriage, or otherwise), close
154
friends, or other intimates."
According to Professor Hern~ndez, recently adopted mortal
remains legislation in Oklahoma, Oregon, and Texas 155 offers the ideal
mechanism to promote the "autonomy of the individual to construct
families of choice." 156 This legislation expressly authorizes execution of
a legally binding document by which a decedent can assign control
over her remains to a "proxy."1 57 Professor Hernindez concluded that
such legislation thus "respects the changing definition of the family by
permitting a decedent to choose the person with whom he or she feels
rather than
a close familial connection to act as his or her agent,"
158
connection.
this
have
members
biological
assuming
151. Gary, supranote 32, at 42.
152. Horan, supra note 64, at 456.
153. Herndndez, supra note 24, at 1023 (proposing the decedent-controlled approach that
allows the decedent to define her "family of choice").
154. Mary L. Clark, Keep Your Hands Off My (Dead)Body: A Critique of the Ways in Which
the State Disrupts the Personhood Interests of the Deceased and His or Her Kin in Disposing of
the Dead and Assigning Identity in Death, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 89 (2005).
155. Herndndez, supra note 24, at 973.
156. Id. at 1007-08.
157. Id. at 973. For a discussion of "personal preference laws," with specific focus on Illinois
legislation, see Murphy, supra note 90, at 406-07.
158. Hernindez, supra note 24, at 1026-27.
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Since publication of Professor Hern6ndez's article, one state
legislature has passed a statute implementing a decedent-controlled
definition of family. In 2003,159 Missouri enacted statutory default
rules for "custody, control, and disposition of deceased human
remains" 16 0 that allow a decedent to choose her own definition of
family. Section 194.119(8) provides that "[a]ny person may designate
an individual to be his or her closest next-of-kin, regardless of blood or
marital relationship, by means of a written instrument that is signed,
16 1
dated, and verified."'
Despite its advantages, the decedent-controlled approach
shares the same flaw as the formal and functional approaches: its
family perspective. By limiting its scope to "any person that a
[decedent] may have preferred and viewed as family,"'16 2 this approach
raises an initial definitional question: Did the decedent regard the
claimant as a family member? 16 3 As a result, even the decedentcontrolled approach's more flexible, individualized definition of
"family" is inadequate. It excludes survivors whom a particular
decedent may have regarded as her nearest and dearest but not as
64
members of her family. 1
B. Bypassing the Family Paradigm
Reformers have proposed a second strategy for dealing with the
family paradigm's underinclusiveness. Rather than attempt to
modernize the paradigm's definition of family, they have explored
schemes to avoid the paradigm altogether.
1. Mechanisms for Decedents to Override Family-Based
Default Rules
For over two decades, legislators, judges, scholars, and
practitioners in the trusts and estates field have promoted
testamentary and nontestamentary devices to avoid application of
159. H.R. 394, 92nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2003) (enacting MO. REV. STAT. § 194.119
(2007)).
160. Mo. REV. STAT. § 194.119(2).
161. Id. § 194.119(8). The future of this provision is uncertain, however. The Missouri
legislature is currently considering a bill that would repeal section 194.119(8). S. 1025, 94th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).
162. Hernindez, supra note 24, at 1018 n.259 (emphasis added).
163. Foster, supra note 18, at 234.
164. Id. The focus on "family" may also harm nontraditional family members because "[o]nce
again, the nuclear family may serve as the benchmark at the expense of a decedent's
nonconforming 'family of choice.'" Id.
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family-based intestacy rules to estates. Recognizing that technical
defects in wills give courts the opportunity to void the wills and revert
to family-based intestacy, reformers have liberalized will execution
requirements, 165 excused "harmless errors," 166 and reformed wills to
effectuate a testator's intended disposition of her property.167
Reformers have also focused attention on what Professor John
Langbein has called the "nonprobate revolution."'168 They have shown
that will substitutes, such as revocable trusts, allow testators to
distribute their wealth outside the family paradigm-oriented probate
system. 169 Proponents have argued that these techniques are
particularly useful for individuals whose loved ones do not fit society's
notion of "natural objects of the testator's bounty."' 70 As a result, will
substitutes have become a staple of estate planning for those most
harmed by the family paradigm: unmarried same-sex or opposite-sex
cohabitants, "nontraditional" elders, and other "nonconforming"
17
testators. 1
165. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 1993) (explaining the requirements for
a valid will); James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009 (1992) (discussing the
1990 UPC's implications for the "formalist" system that characterized will execution); Bruce H.
Mann, Formalitiesand Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1994)
(discussing the 1990 UPC's effects on the formalities associated with will execution).
166. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 1997) (setting out harmless error rule);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (1999)
("[e]xcusing [h]armless [e]rrors"); John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errorsin the Execution
of Wills: A Report on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM.L. REV. 1
(1987).
167. See, e.g., Erickson v. Erickson, 716 A.2d 92 (Conn. 1998) (allowing extrinsic evidence of
scrivener's error to establish decedent's true intent that his will provide for the contingency of
marriage, even though the will did not so provide on its face); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP:
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (2003) (permitting reform of "[a] donative
document, though unambiguous ....to conform the text to the donor's intention if ... [it is]
established by clear and convincing evidence ... that a mistake of fact or law, whether in
expression or inducement, affected specific terms of the document; and ... what the donor's
intention was"); John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the
Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1982)
(discussing an apparent increasing willingness of courts to abandon the "old" rule of no
reformation on the ground of mistake).
168. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108 (1984).
169. See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 571 (2008)
(discussing the use of revocable trusts to "avoid the costs, strictures, and family bias of the
probate system and give settlors control over their property at death as well as during life").
170. See, e.g., Jennifer Tulin McGrath, The Ethical Responsibilities of Estate Planning
Attorneys in the Representation of Non-Traditional Couples, 27 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 75, 93-94
(2003) (discussing the benefits of revocable trusts for nontraditional couples); Matthew R.
Dubois, Note, Legal Planningfor Gay, Lesbian, and Non-TraditionalElders, 63 ALB.L. REV. 263,
322 (1999) (recommending revocable trusts for gay, lesbian, or "non-traditional elders").
171. Foster, supra note 169, at 571. For extended discussion of "nonconforming" testators,
see E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from
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Similarly, reformers in the mortal remains context have
explored testamentary and nontestamentary mechanisms to bypass
family-oriented default rules. Early reformers argued that a properly
executed will was the optimal method to effect such a bypass and
ensure a decedent's wishes were enforced after her death. For
example, in a 1930s legal opinion, a Boston law firm "advise[d] ...
[that] such instructions should be contained in the will, in order that
they may have the benefit of the special sanction and force of that
instrument."' 17 2 Proponents of the use of explicit will provisions
emphasized that "[u]nder the majority American rule, the wish of the
deceased expressed in his will is preferred over the desire of any other
173
person."
More recent commentators have looked beyond wills 174 to a
variety of other written 175 instruments to promote a decedent's control
over her remains. 176 For instance, the Oklahoma Bar Association
recommended that senior citizens leave a separate "[l]etter of
instruction regarding [their] funeral, burial, and related matters."'177

MajoritarianCultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
275 (1999).
172. RICHARD W. HALE & RAYMOND B. ROBERTS, THE CREMATION OF THE DEAD AND THE
RIGHT TO CONTROL THE DISPOSITION OF ONE'S BODY 10 (legal opinion of the Hale & Dorr law

firm to the Massachusetts Cremation Society) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
173. Berman Swartz, Comment, Property-Natureof Rights in Dead Bodies-Right of Burial,
12 S. CAL. L. REV. 435, 440 (1939). For a more recent source recommending use of a will, see
Dubois, supra note 170, at 320-21 (stating that "[a] last will and testament should contain. ..
any instructions regarding a funeral or other disposition of remains").
174. Commentators have cited a number of disadvantages of using a will to set out directions
for disposition of remains. For example, a will might not be read or even located until it is too
late to implement the decedent's instructions-after the decedent's burial or cremation. See, e.g.,
Herndndez, supra note 24, at 1020; Horan, supra note 64, at 427; Kester, supra note 64, at 584.
For other objections to wills, see Herndndez, supra note 24, at 1019-21 (citing, inter alia, the
ambulatory nature of wills and the requirements associated with revoking a will); Horan, supra
note 64, at 427-28 (citing possible challenges to the will); JARMAN, supra note 102, at 13-15
(citing the cost associated with wills and the fact that many people do not even utilize wills in
testamentary planning).
175. Although courts have enforced oral instructions, see PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, THE LAW OF
CADAVERS AND OF BURIAL AND BURIAL PLACES 48 (2d ed. 1950); infra notes 298-309 and
accompanying text, commentators have advocated the use of written instruments. See, e.g., HALE
& ROBERTS, supra note 172, at 10 ("A clearly expressed oral request is probably sufficient; but it
has neither the sanction nor the freedom from mistake and error of directions written and
signed.").
176. For an overview of possible documents to be used in disposition of remains, see, for
example, JARMAN, supra note 102, at 6-20.
177. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION, SENIOR CITIZENS HANDBOOK
49 (Myra Palevsky & Cathy Nickel eds., 3d ed. 2001), available at http://www.okbar.org
publiclbrochures/srhandbk.htm. It should be noted, however, that a letter of instruction may not
accomplish the decedent's desired disposition. See KENNETH V. ISERSON, DEATH TO DUST: WHAT
HAPPENS TO DEAD BODIES? 561 (1994):
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In 2005, the Connecticut legislature enacted a bill that gave decedents
broad authority to specify burial or other arrangements in a signed,
witnessed "written document." 178 According to one of the bill's
supporters, its goal was to "mak[e] it clear under our law that each of
us, and each one of our constituents has the ability to make the
decisions in advance regarding the disposition of their own remains
and their own personal funeral arrangements." 179
Still other reformers, including Professor Hernindez, 18 0 have
advocated the use of a "proxy" or "agent" to bypass the family
paradigm. This is particularly true in the same-sex couple context.
Thus, the Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders advised Rhode
Island same-sex couples to execute a signed, notarized document
naming their partner or friend a "funeral planning agent" to avoid the
rule that "[u]pon death, a person's body is given to his or her next-ofkin." 181 Similarly, the Gay Men's Health Crisis successfully lobbied in
favor of New York proxy legislation that allows individuals to override
family default rules and thus provides them "the ability to rest
assured that the loved one of their choice will have control of their
remains and carry out their wishes after they are deceased."1 8 2
Some commentators have looked instead to contractual
methods to avoid family disputes over remains. Specifically, they have
recommended "preneed funeral plans." These plans are prepaid
contracts with funeral homes to ensure that individuals get the
funeral arrangements they want, rather than allowing "family

President Franklin D. Roosevelt. . . left explicit instructions for his funeral in
a four-page letter dated December 26, 1937. He wanted a very simple funeral
with no hearse, lying-in-state or embalming, and burial in an unlined grave
in a plain wooden casket. Unfortunately, these instructions were found in his
safe three days after his burial.
178. S. 1124, 2005 Leg., Jan. Sess. (enacting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-318 (West Supp. 2006)).
179. Conn. House Transcript, June 3, 2005 (statement of Rep. Lawlor), available at
http://web2.westlaw.com.
180. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text. Unlike Professor Hernindez, however,
these proponents of proxy legislation have not emphasized its use to allow a decedent to define
her own family.
181. GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, RHODE ISLAND: OVERVIEW OF LEGAL ISSUES
FOR GAY MEN, LESBIANS, BISEXUALS AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 22 (2007), available at

http://www.glad.org/rights/LGBTOverviewRI.pdf. See Daryl J. Finizio, FuneralPlanningAgent
Designation: An Unused, But Useful, Tool for Same-Sex Couples, 55 R.I. BAR J. 31 (2007)
(discussing the Rhode Island funeral planning agent legislation).
182. Gay Men's Health Crisis, supra note 101. See also Philip Ankel, Where There's A
Will..., 1993 WIS. L. REV. 961, 962-63 (discussing the adverse impact of family default rules on
gay men with AIDS and recommending that Wisconsin adopt legislation that allows decedents to
designate friends or partners as agents for disposition of remains).
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emotions... [to] drive decisions" 18 3 after an individual's death.
Indeed, some proponents have argued that "courts should be even
more zealous in enforcing the decedent's wishes which are expressed
in a valid contract than those expressed in a will, because in the
former case the decedent has paid in advance for the execution of his
wishes." 18 4 A few legislatures expressly endorse such contractual
arrangements. For example, in 1994, the Idaho legislature gave
"prearranged funeral plans" the highest priority to control disposition
of a decedent's remains.1 8 5 Section 54-1140 proclaims that "the
remains of a person must be disposed of as instructed in such
instrument," "[u]nless a compelling public interest makes it
impossible" to do so.' 8 6 According to one commentator, this legislation
was designed to respond to the problem of "[m]ultiple marriages and
serial relationships ... with current spouses, former spouses, live-in
partners and children of different parents each making demands on
18 7
such issues as final disposition of a body."
While most reformers have focused on the use of testamentary
and nontestamentary documents to bypass the family paradigm, a few
American and foreign commentators have suggested an additional, far
more controversial reform to promote enforcement of such documents.
They have proposed "treat[ing] the dead body as property."' 8 8 These
reformers emphasize the "sacred" status of property in the common
law tradition.18 9 Property, they argue, "is the highest form of legal
right, so there are advantages to a person who can be regarded as the
'owner' of 'property.' "190 These reformers conclude that the "best
way"'191 to ensure that decedents rather than family survivors control
disposition of remains is to "recognize a property interest in the
92
human body that vests in the decedent."'
183. Gary Williams, Commentary: Explore Options to Prepay a Funeral, DALY REC. (Bait.,
Md.), Oct. 4, 2005.
184. HALE & ROBERTS, supra note 172, at 5.

185. 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws 423, §§ 1-4.
186. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1140 (2008). A prearranged funeral plan thus overrides family
rights to control disposition of a decedent's remains. Id. § 54-1142(1)(d)-(), (i) (providing family
default rules "in [the] absence of [a] prearranged funeral plan").
187. Carl Gidlund, Rituals After Death, SPOKANE SPOKESMAN-REV., Feb. 17, 2007, at 4.
188. Prue Vines, The Sacred and the Profane: The Role of Property Concepts in Disputes
About Post-Mortem Examination, 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 235, 236 (2007). See also Michelle
Bourianoff Bray, Note, PersonalizingPersonalty: Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies, 69
TEX. L. REV. 209, 211 (1990) ("propos[ing] the creation of a market-inalienable property right in
the human body"); Horan, supranote 64, at 437-42 (same).
189. Vines, supra note 188, at 245.
190. Id.
191. Horan, supranote 64, at 442.
192. Id. at 437.
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In both the inheritance and mortal remains contexts, the
proposed testamentary and nontestamentary schemes are by no
means guaranteed to achieve their goal: avoidance of the family
paradigm. For example, if the decedent executed a document that did
not meet statutory requirements for a valid disposition of her assets or
remains, the family default rules would apply. 19 3 Only compounding
the problem is what Professor Adam Hirsch has called the "tangle of
disparate rules." 194 Mortal remains legislation provides a prime
illustration of the inconsistency in formal requirements. If a Virginia
resident wanted to designate a particular individual to make
arrangements for disposition of her remains after her death, she
would have to make that designation "in a signed and notarized
writing, which has been accepted in writing by the person so
designated." 195 A Minnesota resident, in contrast, would face no such
statutory hurdles to achieving the same objective. She could "direct
the preparation for, type, or place of [her] final disposition, either by
oral or written instructions."' 196 If the Minnesota resident subsequently
moved to another state, however, she would have no assurance that
197
this directive would remain valid and override family default rules.
Will substitutes present another possible obstacle to bypassing
the family paradigm: fraud. Mass marketing of revocable trusts, for
example, has become "one of the fastest growing consumer blitzes in

193. See, e.g., Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 613 (W. Va. Ct. App. 1998) (ruling that
the estate passed by intestacy because the testator and the witnesses to the testator's will did
not sign or acknowledge their signatures in the presence of each other as required by the will
execution statute).
194. Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1070 n.39 (1996)
(referring to will substitutes).
195. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2825 (2008).
196. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 149A.80, subdiv. 1 (West 2006).
197. See Kester, supra note 64, at 592:
[T]he differences in the laws from state to state create a hardship for people
who frequently move or travel. A person moving from one state to another
would have to research the laws of the new state to determine whether his
current bodily remains directive would be valid. Furthermore, the person
might discover that he no longer had a right to appoint an agent, or that he
could not specify where his remains should be interred.
In response, Ms. Kester has proposed "a uniform law... [to] reduce the confusion created by the
differences among state laws with respect to bodily remains." Id. at 593. For a summary of state
disposition of remains laws, see JARMAN, supra note 102, at 30-35.

1380

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 61:5:1351

the nation." 198 Scam artists posing as "certified trust advisors" 199 have
20 0
fleeced vulnerable and unwary Americans of their life savings.
Trust marketers hawk their product as the "cure-all"20 1 for
probate, a supposedly foolproof device to give the property owner
complete control over disposition of her estate. 2 2 Thousands of dollars
later, 203 the purchaser ends up with a kit of worthless trust documents
that are invalid under state law. 20 4 As a result, whatever assets she
has left will be distributed at death to those her state legislature
defines as the "natural objects of her bounty"-her closest relatives20 5
rather than her chosen beneficiaries.

198. Ken Salazar, Living Trust Scams (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
199. Jeanne Finberg, FinancialAbuse of the Elderly in California,36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 667,
669 (2003) ("The scam artists often call themselves 'certified trust advisors' or estate planning
experts, but they are not experts and usually not certified by anyone.").
200. See CBS Evening News: Scam Artists Setting Up Phony Living Trusts Can Strip Seniors
of Their Life Savings, (CBS television broadcast Mar. 14, 2003) (transcript available at LEXIS,
News Library, All News File) (discussing how "scam artists are using living trusts to fleece the
trusting" and stating that "California's attorney general says just one company, the Alliance For
Mature Americans, took millions from the elderly"). For an extended discussion of the human
costs of living trust scams to vulnerable settlors, see Foster, supra note 169, at 584-95.
201. Charles F. Gibbs, The Marketing of Living Trusts by Non-Attorney Promoters, 20
ACTEC NOTES 193, 193 (1994).
202. See Angela M. Vallario, Living Trusts in the Unauthorized Practice of Law: A Good
Thing Gone Bad, 59 MD. L. REV. 595, 598 & n.14 (2000) (discussing living trust marketers'
"unfulfilled promises"); State Bar of Montana, Living Trust Scams and the Senior Consumers,
http://www.montanabar.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=l&subarticlenbr=29 (last visited Aug. 27,
2008) (summarizing and refuting "Fraudulent and Misleading Statements Used in Living Trust
Scams").
203. "The average cost of the living trust forms is $2000." Vallario, supra note 202, at 596
n.3. See also Lawrence Walsh, If You Want a Living Trust, Use a Lawyer You Can Trust,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 2002, at C4 (stating that Pennsylvania victims of living
trust scams "are pressured into spending $2000 to $3000" for living trust kits).
204. Penn. Office of Attorney Gen., Beware of Living Trust Scams, http://www.
attorneygeneral.gov/consumers.aspx?id=304 (last visited Oct. 15, 2008) ("Sometimes victims are
sold worthless 'kits,' costing several thousand dollars, which are nothing more than standard
forms that may or may not be valid, as laws concerning living trusts vary from state to state.").
For examples of such cases, see Foster, supra note 169, at 584-95. For some settlors, the price is
even greater than a worthless trust. See id. at 585-95 (discussing and citing examples of living
trust purchasers who become victims of identity theft and fraudulent investment schemes,
"disqualified from Medicaid, burdened with unnecessary taxes, destitute, or worse-broken in
body and spirit").
205. For example, "[an elderly resident of Sarasota County, Florida" purchased a revocable
trust from an out-of-state trust mill. Death PlanningMade Difficult: The Danger of Living Trust
Scams: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 106th Cong. pt. I.G. (2000) (testimony of
Paul F. Hancock, Deputy Attorney General for South Florida), available at http://aging.
senate.gov/eventslhr53ph.pdf. Unfortunately, the trust turned out to be invalid under Florida
law. Id. As a result, after the purchaser's death, her estate had to go through "full probate
administration." Id. Moreover, because she did not leave a will, her property passed to her
intestate heirs. Id.
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Preneed contracts have an equally checkered past and
present. 20 6 Unscrupulous funeral home operators and their unlicensed
salespeople 2 7 promise their victim the "peace of mind" 208 that comes
210
with planning her own funeral. 20 9 Under a "pay now-die later"
scheme, the consumer enters into a contract with a funeral home
years-even decades-before her death, specifying how and by whom
her remains are to be handled. 2 11 Unfortunately, these contracts turn
out to be risky propositions. Reports abound of funeral service
directors going bankrupt, 21 2 embezzling prepaid funeral accounts, 21 3 or
refusing to perform as directed in the decedent's contract. 2 14 Once
206. For a discussion of the long-standing problems with fraud and misrepresentation in the
preneed contract context, see HUGH Y. BERNARD, THE LAW OF DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD
61-67 (2d ed. 1979). For more recent analyses of funeral industry abuses and state regulatory
efforts, see generally Judith A. Frank, Preneed Funeral Plans: The Case for Uniformity, 4 ELDER
L.J. 1 (1996); Murphy, supra note 90, at 387-96; Ashley Hunt, Note, There Is a New Trend of
Corporate "DeathCare:"Let the Buyer Beware, 27 NOVA L. REV. 449 (2003).
207. See Anthony Gottschlich, State Board Fines 2 Area Funeral Homes; Newcomer,
Routsong Charged with Letting Nonlicensed People Sell Pre-need Contracts, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, June 20, 2007, at A4 (reporting that the "Ohio Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors
... charged two local funeral homes with violating state funeral laws that prohibit anyone but
licensed funeral directors from selling funeral services").
208. Williams, supra note 183.
209. Another supposed "benefit [of preneed contracts] is that you're buying tomorrow's
service at today's cost .... The money is put in a bank trust or an insurance company trust that
will allow it to grow to keep ahead of the inflationary spirals." Jason Kelly, "PayingRespects;"
From Corporate Buyouts to Cremation, the Funeral Industry is Changing the Way It Does
Business, SOUTH BEND TRIB., Jan. 19, 1997, at F1 (quoting Gary Eastlund, president of the
Indiana Funeral Directors Association). According to AARP, "32 percent of older Americans had
prepaid their funeral expenses .... This fact translates, even in a conservative estimate, into
more than $40 billion in 'pre-need' funeral accounts." Nancy J. Herin, Greed Turns "Pre-Needs"
into Problem, BALT. SUN, Jan. 29, 2007, at 1lA.
210. Frank, supra note 206, at 5; Shelby Oppel, Funeral Home Giants Seek Cash, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 23, 2000, at 1B ("Industry insiders call the accounts 'pay now, die
later.' ").

211. BERNARD, supra note 206, at 63 (explaining that "preneed plans" have that name
because the purchaser pays "sums of money... years or months or even decades in advance of
death, the time of 'need' "); Frank, supra note 206, at 5-6 (discussing use of preneed contracts to
"customize fully [the consumer's] funeral").
212. See, e.g., Idaho Funeral Home Bankrupt, Preneed Funds Missing, 8 DEATH CARE BUS.
ADVISOR, July 10, 2003 (reporting that an Idaho funeral home owner declared bankruptcy and
"closed the business without funds being set aside in preneed trust accounts").
213. See, e.g., Daniel Connolly, Consumer Groups Advise Against Prepaid FuneralPolicies,
COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Feb. 6, 2007 (discussing high profile cases of "massive" embezzlement
of prepaid funeral funds in Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee); Matthew Dolan,
Customers Fear Loss of Funeral Prepayments; Thousands Prepaid for Md. Funerals Could Be
Lost, BALT. SUN, Jan. 27, 2007, at 1A (discussing the embezzlement of prepaid funeral accounts
by Stella Funeral Home's owner and employees).
214. See, e.g., Herin, supra note 209, at 11A (quoting the President of the Funeral
Consumers Alliance of Maryland and Environs that "survivors might be told they must spend
more to complete the funeral transaction, though they thought everything had been paid for" and
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again, a decedent's lifetime efforts to avoid the family paradigm may
fail. The very person she hoped to avoid-her closest family membermay end up controlling the disposition of her remains.
Even the most flawlessly drafted and executed will, will
substitute, proxy agreement, or contract may prove equally ineffective
to bypass the family paradigm. As proponents themselves
acknowledge, a decedent's family survivors can challenge the validity
of such documents on grounds of mental incapacity, undue influence,
duress, or fraud. 2 15 "The result of this is often to alter the best-laid
plans of testators, even when those plans are expressly indicated in a
will."216 Donative freedom may ultimately prove illusory for
individuals who choose to leave their assets or remains to those closest
by affective rather than blood or marital ties. 2 17 Here too, the family
paradigm may well defeat a decedent's wishes.
2. Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques
Under this final approach, reformers have concluded that
permitting excluded testators and their survivors "to opt out of a legal
forum that is often biased against them" would also sufficiently avoid
the family paradigm. 218 Trusts and estates scholars have proposed a
variety of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") techniques to protect

citing the example of a woman who "complain[ed] that the owner of a local mortuary, with whom
her father had entered into a pre-need agreement, had stated upon the father's death, 'Prices
have gone up. You owe us another $1,400' "); Jim Miller, Savvy Senior; Go Ahead and Plan It; It's
Your Funeral, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Mar. 22, 2004, at 2D (warning that due to inflation in
future funeral costs funeral homes may "substituteo ... less expensive merchandise" than
specified in the preneed contract).
215. See, e.g., Horan, supra note 64, at 442 (stating that "decedent's relatives who do not
support a same-sex partnership may be more inclined to challenge the decedent's wishes on the
grounds of undue influence or lack of mental capacity so that they can impose their own wishes").
For extended discussion of mental capacity and undue influence challenges to wills, contract to
devise, and will substitutes, see Foster, supra note 18, at 210-19. It should be noted, however,
that will substitutes are less susceptible than wills to challenge on such grounds, See Foster,
supra note 169, at 571-72 & nn. 107-10 (discussing the difficulties of challenging revocable inter
vivos trusts).
216. Horan, supra note 64, at 442.
217. Foster, supra note 18, at 209 ("Donative freedom... can become a 'myth' when a
testator attempts to leave property to those closest by affective rather than by blood or marital
ties.") (citing Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 235
(1996)). For a review of the literature criticizing the use of mental capacity, undue influence, and
fraud doctrines to invalidate wills that deviate from traditional family norms, see Foster, supra
note 18, at 235-39.
218. Spitko, supra note 171, at 314.
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wills that deviate from traditional family norms. 21 9 Professor Spitko,
for example, has called for "testator-compelled arbitration, '' 220 a
scheme that would allow a testator to direct in her will that any future
22 1
will contest be adjudicated by an arbitrator of her choice.
Other ADR proponents focus instead on mediation. They argue
that mediation responds to the full range of issues-both legal and
nonlegal-presented by nonconforming wills. They emphasize that
mediation addresses a common problem with such wills: survivors'
"competing notions of fairness." 222 They also cite mediation's
advantages: reducing administrative and financial costs; 223 promoting
or
privacy and confidentiality; 224 "repair[ing], maintain[ing],
225
relationships among contending parties; and
improv[ing]"
226
empowering parties who feel "marginalized in the judicial process"
227
to fashion their own solution to a dispute.
Reformers in the mortal remains context, in contrast, have
largely ignored ADR techniques as a response to the family paradigm.
The few commentators that have recommended ADR have generally
not focused on the possible use of such techniques to bypass family
default rules. For example, Theresa Ellis has identified mediation as
an "effective method to resolve ... burial disagreements" 228 but in only
one type of case: disputes between divorced parents of a deceased

219. For an extended discussion of procedural mechanisms, including ADR, that reformers
have proposed to respond to the family paradigm in inheritance law, see Foster, supranote 18, at
235-40.
220. Spitko, supra note 171, at 276-77.
221. Id.
222. Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using Mediation to Resolve ProbateDisputes
over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 418 (1997). Reformers
"contend that fairness concerns arise particularly often in cases where a testator departed from
'natural' will distribution patterns to recognize special services provided by one family member
or relationships outside traditional family boundaries." Foster, supra note 18, at 238.
223. See, e.g., Ronald Chester, Less Law, but More Justice?: Jury Trials and Mediation as
Means of Resolving Will Contests, 37 DUQ. L. REV. 173, 198 (1999) (noting that mediation tends
to be quicker and financially less costly than formal litigation); Mary F. Radford, An Introduction
to the Uses of Mediation and Other Forms of Dispute Resolution in Probate, Trust, and
GuardianshipMatters, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 642-43 (2000).
224. Gary, supra note 222, at 424 (stating that mediation enhances "privacy and
confidentiality").
225. Id. at 428.
226. Chester, supra note 223, at 198 (summarizing the findings of a Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court Report on Alternative Dispute Resolution).
227. Gary, supra note 222, at 429 ("Mediation allows parties to craft their own solution to a
dispute.").
228. Ellis, supra note 114, at 299.
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child. 229 One notable exception is Brian Josias, who has explicitly
recognized that family default rules "dol] not necessarily account for
all of the parties who may be involved in a dispute over disposition of
the body."230 He recommends ADR techniques "that combine speed
231
with an ability to entertain viewpoints from many diverse parties."
According to Josias, ADR can address the concerns of those ignored by
the family paradigm, including the decedent, her nonfamily survivors,
religious organizations, funeral organizations, the state, and even the
232
decedent's pets.
In the end, this final bypassing approach also fails to offer a
comprehensive response to the family paradigm. In the inheritance
context, ADR proponents address only one area where that paradigm
distorts disposition of a decedent's property: its adverse impact on
nonconforming wills. 233 In the mortal remains context, even the
principal ADR advocate, Brian Josias, recognizes the limitations of
these techniques. He acknowledges, for example, that because
mediation is nonbinding it may not provide the finality required in
234
resolving disputes over disposition of a decedent's remains.
Ironically, "[t]he very ability of mediation to entertain multiple parties
also means that some parties may not be included in a voluntary
235
mediation."
As the next Part will show, the most promising response to the
family paradigm lies within the very system ADR proponents have
rejected: the traditional adjudication process.

229. Theresa Ellis also recommends the use of mediation for life-support disagreements
between such parents. Id.
230. Brian L. Josias, Note, Burying the Hatchet in Burial Disputes: Applying Alternative
Dispute Resolution to Disputes Concerningthe Interment of Bodies, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1141,
1152 (2004).
231. Id. at 1143.
232. Id. at 1142, 1152. Josias uses Ted Willams's dog "Slugger" as an example of a pet whose
"interests" should be "take[n] into account." Id. at 1152-53. He quotes Williams's 'longtime
friend and business partner, Arthur 'Buzz' Hamon" as saying: "'Ted told me several times that
he wanted to be cremated and have his ashes, and the ashes of his dog Slugger, spread off the
Florida Keys.' "Id. at 1153 n.42.
233. See Foster, supra note 18, at 239-40 (providing a critical analysis of reform proposals).
234. Josias, supra note 230, at 1179.
235. Id. Josias also emphasizes limitations in arbitration as a method for resolving burial
disputes. Id. He states "[a]rbitration may offer some benefits in resolving burial disputes,
particularly where there is a will that must be interpreted and enforced to honor the wishes of
the deceased." Id. However, he concludes that in cases where no will exists, arbitration will not
be as effective as mediation because "the goal of resolving conflict would be in seeking an
agreement between the surviving relatives." Id.
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IV. TRANSCENDING THE FAMILY PARADIGM: INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE
IN DISPUTES OVER DEAD BODIES

In her influential 1986 article Fixed Rules and Discretion in
Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 236 Professor Mary
237
Ann Glendon presented a devastating critique of "well-intentioned"
proposals to expand judicial discretion over distribution of decedents'
238
estates. She argued that, unlike current "fixed rules" of inheritance,
239
a discretionary scheme would "promote[] intrafamily litigation,"
depletion of estates, uncertainty, and judicial intrusions on
testamentary intent. 240 Professor Glendon is not alone. Even though
countries as diverse as China 241 and Great Britain 242 have successfully
employed discretionary schemes, 243 today the overwhelming "weight of
opinion in [the United States] opposes" 24 4 adoption of this more
flexible inheritance model. Professors Langbein and Waggoner have
proclaimed that a discretionary scheme would be "frightening"245 in
the American context. They and other leading trusts and estates
scholars have presented a parade of horribles-a discretionary
litigation,"246 increase
inheritance
scheme
would
"promote

236. Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and
Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165 (1986).
237. Id. at 1186.
238. Id. at 1165.
239. Id. at 1191.
240. Id. at 1186-91.
241. For extended discussion of the Chinese experience, see Foster, Linking Support and
Inheritance,supra note 20; Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model, supra note 20.
242. For a sampling of the literature, see generally W.D. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE
WIDOW'S SHARE (1960); Suman Naresh, Dependents' Applications Under the Inheritance
(Provisionfor Family and Dependents) Act 1975, 96 LAW Q. REV. 534 (1980); Helene S. Shapo, 'A
Tale of Two Systems" Anglo-American Problems in the Modernization of InheritanceLegislation,
60 TENN. L. REV. 707 (1993); Richard R. Schaul-Yoder, Note, British Inheritance Legislation:
DiscretionaryDistributionat Death, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 205 (1985).
243. For a review of the literature on the discretionary family maintenance model adopted by
Great Britain and other Commonwealth countries, see Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance,
supra note 20, at 1209-17. Professor Chester has called particular attention to British
Columbia's successful implementation of a discretionary family maintenance scheme. See
generally Ronald Chester, Disinheritance and the American Child: An Alternative from British
Columbia, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 1; Ronald Chester, Should American Children Be Protected
Against Disinheritance?,32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 405 (1997).
244. WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 481 (Jesse Dukeminier & Stanley M. Johanson eds., 5th
ed. 1995).
245. John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share, 22
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 314 (1987).
246. Verner F. Chaffin, A Reappraisal of the Wealth Transmission Process: The Surviving
Spouse, Year's Support and Intestate Succession, 10 GA. L. REV. 447, 462-63 (1976). See Susan N.
Gary, Marital Partnership Theory and the Elective Share: Federal Estate Tax Law Provides a
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"information and administrative costs, 247 delay distribution of
estates, 248 "impede[] predictability" 249 and certainty, 250 threaten family
harmony and privacy, 251 and
undermine the cherished American ideal
252
of testamentary freedom.
As this Part will show, for over a century, a large number of
courts have done in the mortal remains context precisely what trusts
and estates scholars have rejected. In resolving disputes over dead
253
bodies, these courts have exercised a "benevolent discretion,"
"each... case dealt with separately and in accordance with its own
circumstances." 254 Indeed, in marked contrast to Professor Glendon's
insistence on fixed rules of inheritance, a 1911 New Jersey judge
pronounced "embarrassing" the very notion that there are "hard and

Solution, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567, 581 (1995) ("One concern with the testator's family
maintenance approach is that its adoption would likely lead to increased litigation ....
").
Professor Gary concludes, however, that although a discretionary scheme "likely will lead to
increased litigation ... given the state of today's families, some degree of discretion is
necessary." Gary, supra note 32, at 71.
247. Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND.
L.J. 1, 12 n.42 (1992). See J. Thomas Oldham, Should the Surviving Spouse's Forced Share Be
Retained?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 223, 231 (1987) (stating that the discretionary English family
maintenance "system probably would complicate the administration of many decedents'
estates"); Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-FactorApproach, supra note 35, at 284-85 (stating that "an
open-ended inquiry intestacy scheme ... would be greatly more expensive than is administration
under extant American intestacy schemes"); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our
Multiple-Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J.
683, 726-29 (1992) (stating that one reason the drafters of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code
rejected a discretionary equitable distribution scheme for marital property rights was the
difficulty of reconciling the "multitude of [property] regimes" followed by the various states).
248. See BRASHIER, supra note 30, at 25 (criticizing the family maintenance system, in part,
as "time-consuming" because of its "individualized inquiries"); Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor
Approach, supra note 35, at 284-85 (stating that an "open-ended inquiry intestacy scheme ...
would be more time-consuming").
249. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 245, at 314.
250. See WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, supra note 244, at 481 (emphasizing that
discretionary schemes create "uncertainty [, which] would make estate planning much more
difficult"); Gary, supra note 32, at 69 (stating that the "testator's family maintenance.., idea
has never caught hold here, however, perhaps because of a desire for certainty"); Spitko, An
Accrual/Multi-FactorApproach, supra note 35, at 284-89 (criticizing the discretionary approach
for creating uncertainty); Waggoner, supra note 247, at 726-29 (discussing the uncertainty in
discretionary equitable distribution schemes).
251. See Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritanceand the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
83, 131 (1994) (stating that the discretionary family maintenance model would encourage
claimants to air "an enormous amount of a family's dirty laundry").
252. See BRASHIER, supra note 30, at 27 ("Americans are unlikely to welcome ... the
system's substantial incursion upon testamentary freedom."); Brashier, supra note 251, at 13132 (stating that freedom of testation "withers away under the system of testator's family
maintenance").
253. Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 128 (N.Y. 1926).
254. De Festetics v. De Festetics, 81 A. 741, 742 (N.J. Ch. 1911).
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fast rules ... binding strictly on the conscience of the court because
255
the court might find its duty to lie entirely beyond their scope."
This flexible, individualized approach to mortal remains
disputes transcends the family paradigm. In the interests of justice,
courts have rejected the claims of even the family member the default
rules most privilege: the decedent's surviving spouse. 256 A 1942
Arkansas case 257 is illustrative. The court considered whether Inez
Nelson Cabe's husband, Jim Cabe, or her mother, Grace Thompson,
was entitled to custody of her remains. 258 The court acknowledged the
"general rule" that the surviving spouse has the "primary and
2 59
paramount right" to possession of a deceased spouse's remains.
Nonetheless, the court departed from this rule and awarded custody to
the decedent's mother rather than husband because of the particular
facts of the case:
During [Inez Cabe's] last illness she was in her mother's home and was administered to
and provided for by her mother. During all of her illness, which resulted in her death,
her husband manifested not the slightest interest in his wife's welfare, made no inquiry
or provisions for her, did not visit2 her
and in fact there was no evidence in this record
60
that he even attended the funeral.

Had this case involved disposition of Inez Cabe's assets rather
than her remains, the outcome would have been very different. In
most jurisdictions, despite his reprehensible conduct, Jim Cabe would
have inherited his wife's estate. 26 1 A court would have no flexibility to
adjust inheritance rights to reflect a mother's care and a husband's
neglect. This problem is surmountable, however.
In earlier work, I explored possible alternatives to the family
paradigm of inheritance law. 26 2 I concluded that two approaches
offered the greatest promise: what I called the decedent intent
approach263 and the actual relationship approach.264 The decedent
intent approach would base inheritance rights on the decedent's own
definition of the "natural objects" of her bounty-family and nonfamily
255. Id.
256. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
257. Teasley v. Thompson, 165 S.W.2d 940 (Ark. 1942).
258. Id. at 941.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. This assumes that Inez Cabe died intestate. The court opinion does not indicate
whether or not she left a valid will. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text (discussing
and citing literature on the failure of status-based inheritance rules to penalize wrongdoers for
misconduct toward the decedent).
262. Foster, supranote 18, at pt. III.B.
263. Id. at 257-68.
264. Id. at 268-71.
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alike. 2 65 This approach would consider the full range of decedents'

expressions of their dispositive preferences, from formally executed
wills to oral statements of intent. 266 The actual relationship approach,
in contrast, would base inheritance rights on the decedent's actual
relationships with others in her life. 26 7 Such relationships would

include relationships involving support, 268 financial sharing, 269 legal
obligations or decisionmaking authority for the other party, 270 or a
decedent's "attitude of generosity toward a person or organization that
would likely have continued had death not intervened." 271 An actual
272
relationship approach would also adopt a behavior-based approach.
It would explicitly consider survivors' treatment of the decedent
during her lifetime.
In litigation over dead bodies, both the decedent intent
approach and the actual relationship approach are already a reality.
This historical experience should inspire reformers in the inheritance
as well as the mortal remains field to explore new directions that lie
outside the family paradigm.
A. The Decedent Intent Approach
Donative freedom is supposed to be the guiding principle of
American inheritance law. Indeed, courts invoke testator intent
regularly as their "lodestar."273 Yet, in practice, many of those same
courts impede rather than effectuate intent. Courts routinely deny
probate to documents that they acknowledge represent a testator's
wishes.27 4 Even the most minor deviations from will execution

265. Id. at 257.
266. Id. at 257-68.
267. Id. at 268.
268. Id. at 269.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 270.
271. Id.
272. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing a behavior.based model of
inheritance).
273. See, e.g., Lounden v. Bollam, 258 S.W. 440, 444 (Mo. 1924) (stating that "the testator's
intention is the lodestar by which the courts are to be guided in determining the meaning of a
will"); In re Estate of Janney, 446 A.2d 1265, 1266 (Pa. 1982) ("It is settled in this
Commonwealth, as in New Jersey, that the intention of the testator is of primary importance,
the lodestar, cornerstone, cardinal rule.").
274. See Mann, supra note 165, at 1036 ("Courts have routinely invalidated wills for minor
defects in form even in uncontested cases and sometimes even while conceding-always ruefully,
of course-that the document clearly represents the wishes and intent of the testator.").

2008]

INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE

1389

formalities may defeat testamentary intent. 275 Similar problems exist
in judicial interpretation and construction of wills. Courts adopt an
approach that one commentator calls "just plain strange." 276 Rather
than admitting evidence of what the testator actually meant by the
words she used in her will, courts determine testamentary intent
277
solely from the "everyday and ordinary" meaning of those words.
When confronted with gaps in wills, courts once again ignore the
actual intent of the testator. Instead of considering what that specific
testator would have wanted under the circumstance she failed to
anticipate, courts address gaps "on the basis of a presumed intent that
bears no necessary relationship to the individual case at hand." 278 As
for intestacy cases, even the most irrefutable evidence of an
individual's dispositive preferences and relationships with survivors is
irrelevant. 279 Courts mechanically apply intestacy laws and distribute
estates according to the legislature's definition of the "normal
desires" 28 0 of decedents.
In resolving disputes over dead bodies, courts have also
proclaimed testator intent sacrosanct. 28 1 An 1895 Iowa case summed
up this view best: "It always has been, and will ever continue to be,
the duty of courts to see to it that the expressed wish of one, as to his
28 2
final resting place, shall, so far as it is possible, be carried out."

275. Bruce H. Mann, Self-Proving Affidavits and Formalism in Wills Adjudication, 63 WASH.
U. L.Q. 39, 49 (1985) (discussing cases in which courts invalidated wills for execution defects
even though "there was little or no question that the testator had intended the instrument to be
a will"). For an example of such a case, see supra note 193 (discussing Stevens v. Casdorph).
276. Jane B. Baron, Essay: Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630, 663
(1992).
277. In re Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 547 N.E.2d 1152, 1153-54 (N.Y. 1989) ("Courts
construing donative instruments are governed by a threshold axiom: a testator's intent, as
ascertained 'from the words used in the will ... according to their everyday and ordinary
meaning,' reigns supreme.") (citations omitted).
278. Mann, supranote 165, at 1053.
279. Foster, supra note 18, at 206-09, 263 (discussing intestacy law).
280. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 1 gen. cmt. (1969) (amended 1990).
281. See, e.g., Cottingham v. McKee, 821 So. 2d 169, 172 (Ala. 2001) ("[I]f a testator
unambiguously expresses in his will how his body is to be disposed of, it is incumbent upon the
executor and the court to honor the testate's wishes."); Wood v. Butterworth, 118 P. 212, 214
(Wash. 1911) (stating that "the wishes of the deceased person, if ascertained, should be given
controlling force").
282. Thompson v. Deeds, 61 N.W. 842, 843 (Iowa 1895). The court explained:
In one view, it is true it may not matter much where we rest after we are
dead; and yet there has always existed, in every person, a feeling that leads
him to wish that after his death his body shall repose beside those he loved in
life. Call it sentiment, yet it is a sentiment and belief which the living should
know will be respected after they are gone.
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There is a striking difference in the mortal remains context, however.
Unlike their counterparts in inheritance disputes, these courts have
given real content to their stated commitment to effectuate testator
intent. Courts have consistently enforced an individual's wishes
concerning disposition of her remains regardless of whether she
expressed those wishes in a formal instrument or "parol or non-formal
disposition] ."283
Respect for a decedent's testamentary wishes regarding her
remains has a long history. Indeed, as American courts have
emphasized, that history extends as far back as ancient Rome. 28 4 In
the nineteenth century, American courts broke with English common
law precedent and expressly recognized "the right of a person to
provide by will for the disposition of his body."285 Testamentary
directions have often trumped family default rules. For example, a
New York testator, Benjamin Eichner, provided in his will that he
wanted his executors to cremate his body, preserve his ashes "in a
suitable receptacle," and inter his ashes in a Brooklyn cemetery "in as
close proximity to the graves of [his] departed beloved parents as is
possible." 2 86 After his death, Eichner's next of kin objected to
cremation. 287 The court ruled that the relatives' opposition was
"without legal support or any other force" 28 8 because "the wishes of a
decedent in respect of the disposal of his remains are paramount to all
other considerations. ' 289 The court warned Eichner's executors that if

283. In re Estate of Johnson, 7 N.Y.S.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1938).
284. See, e.g., id. at 87-89 (reviewing Roman civil law). See also JACKSON, supranote 175, at
42 (" 'The ancient Greeks and Romans were particular to carry out the directions of the deceased
respecting the disposition of his body.'" (quoting John H. Corwin, Burial Law, 39 ALB. L.J. 196,
197 (1889))).
285. In re Riegle's Estate, 32 N.Y.S. 168, 171 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1894). English common law
precedent held that because "there can be no property in a corpse," an individual could not make
a valid and binding disposition of her body by will. In re Estate of Henderson, 57 P.2d 212, 214
(Cal. Ct. App. 1936). Although a few courts continued to follow the English rule, see, e.g., Enos v.
Snyder, 63 P. 170, 171 (Cal. 1900), "the clear trend of American authority [was] contrary to the
strict, ancient English rule." Estate ofHenderson, 57 P.2d at 214. Even under the more expansive
view, this testamentary right is not absolute, however. See In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108,
110 (Utah 1978) (stating that a person's disposition of his body "should be recognized and held to
be binding after his death, so long as that is done within the limits of reason and decency as
related to the accepted customs of mankind" and emphasizing that "this right should [not] be
regarded as an absolute property right by which a person could give absurd or preposterous
directions that would require extravagant waste of useful property or resources, or be offensive
to the normal sensibilities of society in respect for the dead").
286. In re Estate of Eichner, 18 N.Y.S.2d 573, 573 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1940).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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they failed to comply with the will's instructions, they faced criminal
290
prosecution.
Courts have also recognized decidedly less formal documents.
For instance, in Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Heller,29 1 a New Jersey
court ascertained the decedent's wishes regarding his final resting
place from "correspondence in his files" relating to his plans to erect a
mausoleum in Newark's Mount Pleasant Cemetery. 292 Another New
Jersey case, Bruning v. Eckman FuneralHome, 293 featured a "written
directive" 294 that gave the decedent's "beloved" 295 companion of twentythree years rather than his estranged wife control over his "final
burial."296 The court ruled that this document was as valid an
297
expression of decedent intent as a formally executed will.
In marked contrast with inheritance cases, courts have upheld
oral statements of a decedent's wishes if clear and convincing evidence
of those wishes exists. 298 Consider, for example, the sad case of Dr.
290. Id. See also Kasmer v. Limner, 697 So. 2d 220, 221 & n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
("remind[ing]" personal representatives who objected on religious grounds to cremating the
testator that "their duty... is to administer this estate in accordance with the terms of Mr.
Limner's will" and "[if they] cannot act in compliance with the will because of their religious
views, they are free to resign or ask the probate court to appoint suitable individuals who can
carry out the decedent's wishes").
291. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Heller, 84 A.2d 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1951).
292. Id. at 486. This correspondence showed that Paul E. Heller "negotiated for the erection
of the mausoleum and procured elaborate sketches, blueprints and estimates, but material
shortages during the war years prevented him from completing his project." Id.
293. Bruning v. Eckman Funeral Home, 693 A.2d 164 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
294. Id. at 165.
295. Id. "During the time that Helstowski and decedent lived together, she took care of him
when he was ill and tended to his personal business affairs." Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. The court remanded the case, however, to determine whether the directive expressed
the decedent's intent. Id. at 168. Some courts have even determined decedent intent from
revoked wills. See, e.g., In re Salomon, 766 N.Y.S.2d 294, 296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (stating that
"[o]f particular significance to the intent of the decedent regarding to the disposition of his
remains is a document written in Hebrew which purports to be a prior will that had been
revoked" and concluding from a translated "portion of the document which referred to the
expense of a headstone ..that the decedent anticipated an interment upon his death").
298. See In re Estate of Scheck, 14 N.Y.S.2d 946, 952 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1939) (requiring "a clear
and convincing demonstration by competent and credible testimony"). Under this standard,
courts have not enforced statements "expressed during life [that] may have been declared
casually or lightly." Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 129 (N.Y. 1926). Thus, for example, a
Nebraska court held that a statement made by a twenty-one-year-old decedent when he was nine
or ten years of age "f[ell] far short of being a dying request, or of proving a dying wish." McEntee
v. Bonacum, 92 N.W. 633, 634 (Neb. 1902). Courts have also required that oral statements be
made by a mentally competent individual. See Rosenblum v. New Mt. Sinai Cemetery Ass'n, 481
S.W.2d 593, 595 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (refusing to enforce a decedent's oral statements that he
wanted to be buried in St. Louis because when he made those statements he suffered from a
"mental condition, brought about by high blood pressure, induced by arteriosclerosis and the
effects of terminal cancer, and .. differences in his personality and attitude toward his
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Joseph P. Wales, whose wife "had alienated [his] affection and
regard... , and had also destroyed his happiness and peace of mind,
by her intemperate habits and mode of living."299 For the final two
years of his life, Dr. Wales was "without society or companionship in
his home and frequently turned to his sister ... for solace and
companionship." 300 During this period, he told his sister and a funeral
home director that he wanted to be buried in the Wales family vault
"and not with his wife when she, of course, should die. '30 1 The court
honored these wishes despite strong opposition from Dr. Wales's
widow.302
Courts have even allowed subsequent oral statements to alter
or revoke burial instructions in a validly executed will. In mortal
remains cases, the courts' principal goal is "ascertainment of the latest
expression of wish by the testator on the subject." 30 3 A Florida case is
illustrative. In 1992, Hilliard Cohen executed a will, which directed
that he be buried in a traditional Jewish burial in his family's plot in
New York. 30 4 The Cohen family plot was located in a "Jewish
restricted area." 305 In 1998, Cohen and his wife, Margaret, who was
not Jewish, 30 6 moved to Florida. 30 7 During the final years before his
death, Cohen informed Margaret, his daughter, and his doctor that he
wanted to be buried in Florida "where his wife of forty years could also
rest upon her death."30 8 The court ruled that the burial instructions in
Cohen's will were not binding because clear and convincing evidence
30 9
existed that Cohen had "a change in intent."
Some courts have been so committed to identifying and
effectuating decedent intent that they have not confined their inquiry
to written and oral expressions of that intent. Instead, they have
considered the individual decedent's acts, state of mind, religious
beliefs, and "intensity of... feelings." 310 Consider, for example, a 1924
immediate family between the many years of happy life with wife and daughter and the last
months of his life"). The court instead awarded custody of the decedent's body to his widow for
burial in Evansville, Illinois. Id. at 595-96.
299. Wales v. Wales, 190 A. 109, 111 (Del. Ch. 1936).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 110-11.
303. Estate of Scheck, 14 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
304. Cohen v. Cohen, 896 So. 2d 950, 952 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 951.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 955.
309. Id.
310. Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 129 (N.Y. 1926).
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Minnesota case. 31' Two years before his death, Joseph Soklowski, a
Roman Catholic "in good standing,"3 12 organized the Sacred Heart of
Jesus Polish National Catholic Church, a "schismatic church" that
followed Catholic doctrines but "d[id] not recognize the Pope as its
head. '3 13 On numerous occasions he expressed his "strong desire"3 14 to
be buried in that church's cemetery. 3 15 On his deathbed, however,
Soklowksi called for a Roman Catholic priest to administer the last
rites. 31 6 The court concluded that this act was clear evidence of
Soklowski's final wishes regarding disposition of his remains:
[B]y Joseph Soklowski's calling for the priest of the Roman Catholic Church to
administer the last sacrament and receiving it, he renounced all previously expressed
desires to be buried in the cemetery of the schismatic church he had organized and
plainly announced a final desire to be buried as a Roman Catholic
in ground consecrated
3 17
for that purpose according to the practice of that religious faith.

The court's resolution makes sense. While calling for a Roman
Catholic priest might have been consistent with Soklowski's beliefs to
some extent, his actions raised doubts about the depth of his rejection
of Roman Catholic practice. Approaches that required an express
declaration of intent would necessarily fail to deliver individualized
justice in this instance.
As the next Section will show, courts have adopted an equally
flexible,
individualized
approach
in
evaluating
decedents'
relationships with claimants.
B. The Actual RelationshipApproach
In resolving disputes over dead bodies, courts have a long
tradition of looking beyond family status to consider the actual
relationships between decedents and their survivors. The reasons for
this different tradition are not apparent. Humanistic impulses, largely
unfettered by economic considerations, may simply be stronger in the
mortal remains context. Religious, cultural, and moral beliefs may
play a greater role. But, whatever the reason, as a Pennsylvania judge
proclaimed, "In cases involving burial rights, the relationships

311.
1924).
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Sacred Heart of Jesus Polish Nat'l Catholic Church v. Soklowski, 199 N.W. 81 (Minn.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 83.
at 81, 83.
at 82.
at 82-83.
at 83.
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between the parties and decedent play the dominant role.

. . ,"318 The
New Jersey case of Felipe v. Vega 319 illustrates this key divergence
between approaches to dispositions of decedents' assets and remains.
In 1987, Edilberto Vega was killed in an automobile
accident.3 20 He died intestate, survived by his partner, Ana Felipe;
their daughter, Sueheidi Alexis Vega; his father, Lino Vega; and
"certain relatives." 321 Edilberto and Ana had lived together since 1982
but never married. 322 They had a "very close and loving
relationship." 323 After Edilberto's death, Ana's love for her deceased
partner "continue[d] to be strong and her desire to express her
devotion to him [was] a substantial force in her life." 324 Had this case
involved inheritance of Edilberto's estate, the court would have had to
apply intestacy's rigid status-based rules. Ana was not Edilberto's
325
legal spouse; hence, she would not qualify as his intestate heir.
Contrast this result with what in fact happened in the case.
Felipe v. Vega was a dispute between Ana and Edilberto's
father, Lino, over where to bury Edilberto. 326 Because Edilberto had
"expressed no preference" 327 regarding disposition of his remains, New
Jersey's default rules governed. Just as in intestacy, these rules did
not extend rights to Ana because she was not the "surviving spouse of
the decedent." 328 Here, however, the judge was flexible enough to
depart from the family paradigm-based default rules and recognize
the actual relationship between Edilberto and Ana. 329 The judge ruled
in favor of Ana as plaintiff, stating: "I see no reason why plaintiffs
non-marital status alters any of the considerations already related.

318. Pulaski v. Kyzer, 18 Pa. D. & C.3d 223, 226 (Pa. C.P. Ct. 1980).
319. Felipe v. Vega, 570 A.2d 1028 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989).
320. Id. at 1029.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1031.
325. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-3 (West 2008) (amended 2006 to give "domestic partner[s]," as
well as "surviving spouse[s]," an intestate share).
326. Lino wanted his son buried in Mt. Holly, New Jersey near his home in the same
cemetery where he had buried another son. Felipe, 570 A.2d at 1029. Unfortunately, this
cemetery was located one hour away from Ana's home. Id. Ana did not drive and no public
transportation was available. Id. Thus, she wanted Edilberto buried in an Egg Harbor City, New
Jersey cemetery "within walking distance of her home." Id.
327. Id. at 1031.
328. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:27-22(a)(1) (West 2008) (amended 2006 to give "surviving domestic
partner[s]," as well as "surviving spouses" the right to control disposition).
329. The judge also considered the relationship between Edilberto and Lino. "In contrast,
although Vega appears to be a loving and caring father, his contact with Edilberto during the
last seven years of his life appears to have been minimal." Felipe, 570 A.2d at 1029.
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Plaintiffs love and her devotional needs seem no less strong because
'33°
of it.
Unlike their counterparts in inheritance cases, 331 these courts
have also used a comprehensive behavior-based approach in assigning
rights to a decedent's remains. Courts evaluate the full range of
claimants' conduct-good and bad-toward the decedent both during
her lifetime and after her death to determine if the claimant is
entitled to control the decedent's remains. In a 1925 Pennsylvania
case, the court confronted an "unseemly quarrel" between a daughter,
Annie, and two sons, Henry and Allie, "over disposition of the dead
body of their father," Thomas A. Gwyn. 33 2 Under family default rules,
the three children had equal rights to custody of their father's remains
because they were each his next of "kin of the same degree of
relationship."33 3 Under a behavior-based scheme, however, only Annie
deserved custody.
The court presented a detailed assessment of the three
claimants' treatment of their father. Annie's behavior was exemplary.
For the final seventeen years of Thomas's life, "she alone appear[ed] to
have entertained sentiments of dutiful respect and affection for her
father." 334 During his "last illness," 335 Annie took her father into her
home and cared for him. 336 She chose a "natural and fitting place to
bury him": "his boyhood home" in Nashville next to his parents and
other family members. 33 7 Henry's and Allie's behavior, in contrast,
was "vengeful and unworthy." 338 "[F]or almost twenty years, [they]
entertained no interest in, or friendship or affection for their
father."3 39 Both during Thomas's lifetime and after his death, they
"nourished feelings of bitter and vengeful animosity toward him."340
Unlike Annie, Henry and Allie sought to bury their father in
Philadelphia, "in foreign ground and among strangers." 341 According to
the court, the sons' choice of burial spot was motivated by a truly
"malign" purpose: their "burning desire to wreak a posthumous

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id. at 1031.
See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
Boyd v. Gwyn, 6 Pa. D. & C. 275, 275 (Pa. C.P. Ct. 1925).
Id. at 276.
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 277.
Id.
Id.
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vengeance upon him by preventing his ashes from resting peacefully
beside his parents and among his own people."3 42 Citing "every
consideration of justice and equity," the court awarded custody of
343
Thomas's body to Annie.
Courts have gone still further. They have used a behaviorbased approach in cases involving relatives of different degrees of
kinship. They have rejected the claims of family members with
"paramount rights" to dispose of a decedent's remains-the surviving
spouse and children-in favor of more distant relatives who
maintained a better relationship with the decedent.3 44 In a recent Ohio
case, for instance, the court ruled in favor of the decedent's parents
rather than her husband despite "the universal rule of preference
given the surviving spouse. ' 345 The court emphasized that the
decedent had lived with, and was in the care of, her parents, who "bore
a very close and loving relationship with their daughter."3 46 As for her
husband, he had a "tenuous relationship with his wife prior to her
death."347 After his wife's death, he displayed no "love, honor or
respect" 348 for her. Instead, "his conduct was 'egregious, greedy, and a
gross infringement of any form of decency.' 349
Similarly, a New York judge awarded custody of a decedent's
body to his executors, mother, aunt, and cousin rather than to his
daughter.3 5 0 The judge acknowledged the daughter's "natural right...
as the nearest next of kin to dictate the manner and place of her
father's burial." 351 Nonetheless, he concluded from a detailed
assessment of the record that the daughter had forfeited her right by
her persistent failure to treat her father with "dutiful respect and
affection."352
342. Id. at 278.
343. Id.
344. See Feller v. Universal Funeral Chapel, Inc., 124 N.Y.S.2d 546, 551 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953)
(referring to a daughter's "paramount right as nearest next of kin"); supra note 89 and
accompanying text (discussing the "paramount right... [of] the surviving spouse of the
deceased").
345. Spanich v. Reichelderfer, 628 N.E.2d 102, 104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
346. Id. at 107.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. (quoting trial court opinion).
350. Feller v. Universal Funeral Chapel, Inc., 124 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547, 551 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1953).
351. Id. at 551.
352. Id. The judge recognized that the estrangement between daughter and father was for
"understandable" reasons. Id. at 550. The decedent had abandoned his wife and daughter for a
"relationship with one other than his wife." Id. at 551. The record revealed that "normal parental
and filial relations [did] not exist at the time of death." Id. The daughter refused even to see her
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Finally, in a truly dramatic departure from inheritance law
and practice, courts have recognized in mortal remains cases that a
decedent's nearest and dearest may be those the family paradigm
excludes altogether: individuals related by affection and support
354
rather than blood.3 53 The 1934 Texas case of Burnett v. Surratt
illustrates how courts can apply both approaches outlined above-the
decedent intent approach and the actual relationship approach-to
transcend the family paradigm.
After his death, W.A. Burnett's wife of "two or three years,"
Zudie, took possession of his body, sent it to a local funeral home, and
ordered it interred in the Restland Memorial Cemetery in Dallas,
Texas. 355 Burnett's executors sued to enjoin the interment, arguing
that Burnett should be buried instead in St. Louis, Missouri.3 56 The
trial court granted a temporary injunction.3 5 7 The appellate court
affirmed this judgment, 358 applying both the decedent intent approach
and the actual relationship approach.
First, the court ascertained Burnett's intent regarding
disposition of his remains from his acts and oral statements. It noted
that Burnett had buried his first wife in Calvary Cemetery in St.
Louis, had purchased a grave next to hers, and had "erected at her
grave a double tombstone; on one side of it was the name of his
deceased wife, and on the other side a blank space left for his own
name." 359 Moreover, the court cited the fact that Burnett had often

father during the final months of his life. Id. at 548. Instead, she wrote nasty letters to him,
accusing him of acting "like a cheap adolescent instead of a decent father," leading an "unnatural
way of life," and failing to support her in the manner she deemed appropriate. Id. at 548-49.
"She did not belong in the Bronx nor behind a Woolworth counter, as she wrote her father." Id. at
551.
353. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing the family paradigm); see also
Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878 (Pa. 1904) ("A more distant relative or even a friend not
connected by ties of blood may have a superior right under exceptional circumstances to one
nearer of kin .. ").For an example of such a case, see Koon v. Doan, 2 N.W.2d 878, 879 (Mich.
1942) (ruling that the friends with whom the decedent lived for eighteen years rather than his
children should control disposition of his remains). The court contrasted the actual relationships
of the parties toward the decedent. The decedent had "enjoyed the closest friendship with [the
defendants]," his "real home.., was with the defendants... [, and d]ecedent was almost a
member of defendants' family for 18 years." Id. at 878-79. On the other hand, none of his
children "saw or visited their father nor evidenced any interest in him for over a long period of
years prior to his death." Id. at 878.
354. Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
355. Id. at 1041-42.
356. Id. at 1041.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 1043.
359. Id. at 1042.
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told his friends and associates that he wanted to be buried in St. Louis
360
next to his first wife.
Second, the court used the actual relationship approach to
evaluate the parties' behavior. This approach only added further
support for rejecting Zudie's claim. The record revealed that at the
time of Burnett's death, he and Zudie were estranged and not living
together. 361 The reason for the separation reportedly was that Zudie
"had slapped him, abused him,... called him harsh and vile
names,... 'left him, did not care for him, and ... wouldn't come back
and take care of him while he was sick.' "362 Burnett's will repeated
these allegations and expressly disinherited his wife. 363 The court
emphasized that Burnett's executors, in contrast, were "a sister of his
deceased wife, . . . a business associate, and ... a friend of many years
standing. '364 As a result, the court ruled in the executors' favor. 365 Its
rationale was a classic statement of the discretionary, individualized
scheme that inheritance reformers have condemned roundly-a
scheme that gives courts the flexibility to depart from the family
paradigm and base rights on the particular decedent's intent and
actual relationships with survivors. As the Burnett court held:
There is no established rule alike to all cases, but each must be considered on its own
merits. The wishes of the surviving spouse, it may be said, should be and are generally
considered by the courts as paramount, if the parties were living in the normal relations
of marriage, but where, as in this case, an estrangement exists, the parties separated,
and hard feelings are engendered by the survivor, or where the sentimental ties of
human emotions are stronger to others than to the surviving spouse, the wishes of the
impel a court of equity in holding that the decedent's wishes should
decedent 6 strongly
3 6
prevail.

V. CONCLUSION

Trusts and estates scholars have challenged the outdated
family paradigm that dominates and distorts disposition of decedents'
estates. 367 They have demonstrated that inheritance law's bias in
favor of the "traditional" family excludes members of today's American
families, rewards the unworthy, ignores the meritorious and needy,

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1043.
Id. at 1042.
See supra Part II.A.
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368
and denies decedents control over distribution of their own property.
Yet, those same scholars have rejected the approach that would best
address the injustices of the family paradigm: an equitable,
individualized scheme that would transcend the family paradigm and
base inheritance rights on the particular individual's intent and actual
relationships with her survivors. 369 Abstract notions of administrative
convenience, efficiency, and certainty have triumphed over human
needs and desires.
The mere mention of individualized justice conjures up images
of lengthy proceedings, excessive expense, and judicial bias in favor of
"traditional" family members. 370 As a result, legal scholars proposing
reforms have felt obligated to replace one set of rules with another. In
the process, they have invariably and sometimes unintentionally
remained within the family paradigm. The examples, surveyed in this
Article, of more than one hundred courts ignoring formal, familybased rules to deliver individualized justice make three contributions
to the reform effort. First, these cases demonstrate, in the mortal
remains context at least, a strongly felt need for individualized justice.
Second, they suggest that fears of lengthy proceedings, excessive
expense, and judicial bias are exaggerated. In disputes over dead
bodies, courts usually delivered individualized justice within the
constraints of judicial economy 3 71 and supported the claims of even
those survivors most often excluded by the family paradigm:
decedents' unmarried partners and nonrelated caregivers and
friends.3 7 2 Third, these cases show that judges' rationales for
individualized decisions are generally more reasonable and convincing
373
than are the rationales for rule-based decisions.

368. See id.
369. See supra notes 236-251 and accompanying text. There are a few notable exceptions,
however. See, e.g., Chester, supra note 243; Gaubatz, supra note 45.
370. Gary, supra note 42, at 681:
Giving a court discretion to determine inheritance rights between family
members raises concerns about the societal norms that may underlie a court's
decision. A judge who disapproves of a family headed by gay or lesbian
partners may be unlikely to find that a parent-child relationship existed,
regardless of the evidence.
Professor Gary nonetheless concluded that "[a] limited degree of discretion and uncertainty is
necessary to make the [intestacy] statute more responsive to more families." Id.
371. Notable exceptions exist, however. See Kester, supra note 64, at 589 (reporting that a
Connecticut woman's "body remained frozen in storage, without a proper disposition, for at least
five years while the various cases worked their way through the courts").
372. See supra Part IV.B.
373. See, e.g., Blackstone v. Blackstone, 639 S.E.2d 369 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a
father who abused and failed to support his son still inherited from his son under Georgia
intestacy law). The court explained its decision:
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This Article calls upon inheritance reformers to revisit the
issue of individualized justice. It has shown that such a scheme is not
in fact as "frightening" as its critics claim. 37 4 This Article has
demonstrated that courts have a long tradition of applying just such a
scheme in resolving disputes over dead bodies. 375 Ironically, the
potential costs are even higher in the mortal remains context than in
inheritance. As courts themselves have acknowledged, "the burial of
the dead is a subject which interests the feelings of mankind to a
much greater degree than many matters of actual property." 376 Indeed,
"delay in the interment of dead bodies ... is repugnant to the
sentiment of humanity." 377 Nonetheless, for over a century, courts
have concluded that individualized justice is more important than
"fixed rules." In so doing, they offer a lesson for inheritance reformers
as well.
This is not to say that courts will never make mistakes. The
case that opened this Article-the battle over Anna Nicole Smith's
body 37 8-provides a prime example. Judge Larry Seidlin, after all,
applied the family paradigm when he awarded custody of Anna
Nicole's remains to her intestate heir, Dannielynn. 379 Note, however,
that a Florida appellate court upheld Judge Seidlin's decision on
family-neutral grounds. 38 0 Analogizing Judge Seidlin's approach to
that of a "tipsy coachman" 38 1 who reaches the right destination by the
wrong route, the court based its ruling on Anna Nicole's intent-her
oral statements that she wanted to be buried in the Bahamas beside
38 2
her beloved son-rather than her survivors' family status.
In the end, the most compelling lesson from history may be the
reminder that inheritance and mortal remains cases involve "[r]eal
We find no authority under Georgia law to warrant a holding that Cal
Blackstone's right to recover as an heir under the laws of descent and
distribution was forfeited by his treatment of and/or lack of support for Corey
during his son's lifetime. While the type of cruel treatment alleged in this
case may result in the loss of parental power and consequent loss of a
parent's right to bring and recover the proceeds from a wrongful death action
for the homicide of a child, Georgia's laws of descent and distribution are
silent on the issue.
Id. at 371.
374. See supranote 245 and accompanying text.
375. See supra Part IV.
376. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 238 (R.I. 1872).
377. Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1041 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
378. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
380. See Arthur v. Milstein, 949 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
381. Id. at 1166.
382. Id.
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people, not abstractions."383 These individuals are more than spouses,
children, parents, and siblings. They have particular human needs,
wishes, relationships, and circumstances. Mortal remains precedent
should thus encourage reformers to look beyond the family paradigm
for an inheritance scheme that considers decedents' entire "stories, in
384
all their richness and detail."

383. Baron, supranote 276, at 664.
384. Id. at 666.

The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of
Angel Investors
61 Vand. L. Rev. 1405 (2008)
DarianM. Ibrahim
their
earliest stages, which
fund
start-ups
in
Angel investors
creates a contractingenvironment rife with uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and agency costs in the form of potential opportunism by
entrepreneurs. Venture capitalists also encounter these problems in
slightly later-stage funding, and use a combination of staged
financing, preferred stock, board seats, negative covenants, and
Curiously, however,
specific exit rights to respond to them.
traditional angel investment contracts employ none of these
measures, which appears inconsistent with what financial
contracting theory would predict. This Article explains this (not so)
puzzling behavior on the part of angel investors, and also explains
the recent move toward venture capital-like contracts as angel
investing becomes more of a professional endeavor.

